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Introduction

B

etween 2005 and 2011, there was much debate both within
Canada and at the United Nations (UN) over what role, if any,
home states should play in regulating and adjudicating transnational
corporate conduct to prevent and remedy associated human rights
harms. In June 2005, the Canadian Parliament’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) adopted
an all-party report of the Parliamentary Subcommittee on Human
Rights and International Development entitled Mining in Developing
Countries [SCFAIT Report].1 The SCFAIT Report concludes that “mining activities in some developing countries have had adverse effects
on local communities,” and it expressed concern that “Canada does
not yet have laws to ensure that the activities of Canadian mining
companies in developing countries conform to human rights standards.”2 In October 2005, the Canadian government tabled a response rejecting many of the SCFAIT Report’s recommendations
due in part to the view that the international community was “still
in the early stages of defining and measuring” corporate social
responsibility (CSR), “particularly with respect to human rights.”3
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House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International
Trade (SCFAIT), Fourteenth Report: Mining in Developing Countries, 38th Parl, 1st
Sess (June 2005) [SCFAIT Report].

2

Ibid at 1-2.

3

Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Mining
in Developing Countries — Corporate Social Responsibility: The Government’s Response
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Mining in Developing Countries — Corporate Social Responsibility: The
Government’s Response to the Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs and International Trade (Government’s Response) did, however,
commit Canada to working with other states to “enhance and clarify
the international normative framework for CSR and accountability”
and expressed support for the work of Harvard professor John G.
Ruggie.4
Ruggie had been appointed Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises in July 2005
— a month after the release of the SCFAIT Report — pursuant to a
resolution of the Commission on Human Rights (precursor to the
UN Human Rights Council) co-sponsored by Canada.5 Part of his
mandate was to “elaborate on the role of States in effectively regulating and adjudicating” business activities relating to human rights.6
In June 2008, the SRSG presented the Protect, Respect and Remedy
Framework for Business and Human Rights to the Human Rights
Council.7 Protect, Respect, and Remedy rested upon three complementary principles: the state duty to protect against human rights abuses
by non-state actors, including business; the corporate responsibility
to respect rights; and the need for greater access by victims to effective remedies. It was unanimously welcomed by member states
to the Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(October 2005) at 2-3, 4 [Government’s Response].
4

Ibid at 3-5.

5

UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR), Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, CHR Res 2005/69, UNCHR, 61st Sess,
UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 (2005). However, Canada is not identified as
an ongoing co-sponsor of the mandate by the Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General (SRSG) in his final oral submission to the UN Human Council
in May 2011, where he thanks Argentina, India, Nigeria, Norway, and the Russian
Federation “for their steadfast leadership and support.” See Ruggie Statement to
UN Human Rights Council May 30, 2011, online: Business and Human Rights
Resource Centre <http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/
ruggie-statement-to-un-human-rights-council-30-may-2011.pdf>.

6

Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Interim Report of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises, UNCHR, 62nd Sess, UN Doc E/CH.4/2006/97
(22 February 2006) at 1 [Interim Report].

7

John Ruggie, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Protect, Respect and
Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, UNHRC, 8th Sess, UN Doc
A/HRC/8/5 (2008) [Protect, Respect, and Remedy].
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in the Human Rights Council, and the SRSG was given a renewed
three-year mandate to provide concrete and practical recommendations for its implementation.8
The Canadian government reiterated its support for the SRSG’s
mandate in a 26 March 2009 policy paper entitled Building the
Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy for the
Canadian International Extractive Sector.9 Curiously, however, Building
the Canadian Advantage gave remarkably little space to Protect, Respect,
and Remedy, which was endorsed more than six months earlier.10 In
May 2011, the SRSG presented a final report to the Human Rights
Council consisting primarily of Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework (Guiding Principles).11 The Guiding Principles too
8

UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Mandate of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises, HRC Res 8/7, UNHRC, 8th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/
RES/8/7 (2008).

9

Canada, DFAIT, Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility
Strategy for the Canadian Extractive Sector (26 March 2009) at 8, online: <http://
www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ds/csr-strategy
-rse-stategie.aspx?view=d> [Building the Canadian Advantage].

10

Ibid. The reference to the SRSG’s work is discussed in a single short paragraph
within the fifteen-page document: “Obligations under international human
rights conventions apply to states and do not directly create obligations for
companies … [The UN framework contains] recommendations on the duties
and responsibilities of both States and corporations with regard to human rights.”
Moreover, the list of international standards identified on the website of the
Centre for Excellence in CSR, one of the outcomes of Building the Canadian
Advantage, does not even list Protect, Respect, and Remedy among UN international
standards. See listed resources under Centre for Excellence in CSR, Policies and
Regulations — United Nations, online: Centre for Excellence in CSR, <http://web.
cim.org/csr/MenuPage.cfm?sections=44&menu=45> (listing the UN Global
Compact; the UN Development Programme; the UN Environment Programme;
the UNEP Finance Initiative; and the UN Department of Economic and Social
Affairs as well as three publications by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development). The Human Rights Council is not listed nor are Protect,
Respect, and Remedy or the Guiding Principles. See also the extensive list of additional CSR frameworks under Tools and Resources: CSR Toolkits: Additional CSR
Frameworks, online: Centre for Excellence in CSR <http://web.cim.org/csr/
MenuPage.cfm?sections=44,136&menu=138>).

11

John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issues
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises:
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UNHRC, 17th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31
(2011) [Guiding Principles]. The Guiding Principles were accompanied by three
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were unanimously endorsed by the Human Rights Council on 16
June 2011, establishing for the first time an international standard,
or, in the words of the SRSG, a “global reference point,” for business
and human rights.12
This article begins with a more detailed overview of these as well
as other developments in Canada between 2005 and 2011 relating
to the regulation and adjudication of human rights concerns associated with global mining. This overview will document the challenges
faced by legal reform proposals designed to prevent and remedy
global mining harms. In particular, it will discuss the SCFAIT Report,
the Government’s Response, and a multi-stakeholder Advisory Group
report completed in March 2007.13 Following this discussion, an
account will be given of the arguments put forward in favour of,
and against, Bill C-300, An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in Developing Countries, which was defeated in October 2010.14 An assessment will then
be provided of the non-judicial dispute resolution process of the
Office of the Extractive Industries CSR Counsellor, which opened
the same year.
The article will then turn to a review of the work of the SRSG in
relation to the home state duty to protect human rights, highlighting

12

13

14

addenda: Addendum: Piloting Principles for Effective Company/Stakeholder Grievance
Mechanisms: A Report of Lessons Learned, UNHRC, 17th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/17/3/
Add.1 (2011); Addendum: Human Rights and Corporate Law: Trends and Observations
from a Cross-National Study Conducted by the Special Representative, UNHRC, 17th
Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31/Add.2 (2011) [Corporate Law Addendum]; and Addendum: Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human
Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract Negotiations: Guidance for Negotiators,
UNHRC, 17th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31/Add.3 (2011).
See United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, New Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights Endorsed by the Human Rights Council,
News Release (16 June 2011), online: Business and Human Rights Resource
Centre <http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/
ruggie-guiding-principles-endorsed-16-jun-2011.pdf>. See also UN Human Rights
Commission, Revised Draft Resolution, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises, UNHRC, 17th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/17/L.17/Rev.1
(2011) (sponsored by Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Guatemala, India,
Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Russian Federation, Sweden, and Turkey).
National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the Canadian Extractive Industry in Developing Countries, Advisory Group Report, 29
March 2007, online: <http://www.mining.ca/www/media_lib/MAC_Documents/
Publications/CSRENG.pdf> [Advisory Group Report].
Bill C-300, An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for Mining, Oil and Gas
Corporations in Developing Countries, 2nd Sess, 40th Parl (2009).
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the conclusions reached in the Guiding Principles. Particular focus
will be placed on the non-legally binding nature of many of the
Guiding Principles, which are notable for their reluctance to recognize explicitly the existence of home state obligations under international human rights law. After a brief assessment of the extent to
which Canadian developments may be consistent with the Guiding
Principles, the article will reflect on the implications of industry and
industry lawyer participation in the development of international
norms relating to the existence, scope, and content of home state
obligations. Specifically, the article will argue that, while engaging
corporations and corporate lawyers in both domestic and international processes relating to business and human rights may be
necessary for pragmatic reasons, the resulting outcomes appear to
be oriented away from legally binding regulation and adjudication.
The article will conclude by reflecting upon the implications of this
phenomenon for our understanding of international law, justice,
and ethics.
Canadian Mining Internationally: From the SCFAIT Report
to the Advisory Group Report (2005-08)
The June 2005 SCFAIT Report arose out of concerns that had been
brought before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development over several years in relation to Canadian
mining projects in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.15 The report
called upon the Canadian government to implement “stronger
incentives” designed to “encourage” mining companies to act “in
a socially and environmentally responsible manner and in conformity with international human rights standards” when operating
outside of Canada.16 Specifically identified was the need to make
Canadian government export and project financing, as well as services provided at missions abroad, conditional upon compliance
with corporate social responsibility and human rights standards,
including human rights impact assessments.17 Stronger monitoring
and complaints mechanisms were called for to address claims of
15

SCFAIT Report, supra note 1 at 1. See also Sara L Seck, “Home State Responsibility
and Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining” (2008) 11 Yale Human
Rights & Dev LJ 177 at 177-80 (outlining some of the evidence presented at committee hearings in March and May 2005 by a range of participants, including
affected communities, civil society, and mining companies).

16

SCFAIT Report, supra note 1 at 2.

17

Ibid.
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“socially and environmentally irresponsible conduct and human
rights violations,” and the need to “clarify, formalize and strengthen
the rules and the mandate” of Canada’s National Contact Point
(NCP) for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
(OECD Guidelines) was recognized.18 Further, Canada was called
upon to “[w]ork with like-minded countries” to strengthen the
substance of the OECD Guidelines with respect to human rights
and to make compliance mandatory.19 Strikingly, the SCFAIT Report
explicitly states that there is a need to establish “clear legal norms
in Canada to ensure that Canadian companies and residents are
held accountable” for environmental and human rights violations
“associated with the activities of Canadian mining companies.”20
The Government’s Response identified a number of “practical policy
challenges” in “translating” the recommendations of the SCFAIT
Report into practice, including the underdeveloped nature of the
“international CSR architecture”; the lack of consensus on “appropriate boundaries between governments, companies and other
stakeholders,” which leads to a “blurring of lines between public and
private responsibilities”; and the need to “reconcile” the “primary
responsibility of host governments” with the call for “global business
standards and accountability mechanisms.”21 While conceding that
more could be done to provide businesses with incentives to achieve
positive environmental and social results in their operations abroad,
the Government’s Response took the position that “further developments” would be necessary in the definition and measurement of
CSR with respect to human rights before government support could
18

Ibid at 2-3. See further OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD,
2000), online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf>
[OECD Guidelines]; and DFAIT Canada, Canada’s National Contact Point for the
OECD MNE Guidelines, online: DFAIT <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade
-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ncp-pcn/index.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=1>
[Canada’s NCP].

19

SCFAIT Report, supra note 1 at 3.

20

Ibid at 3. Also identified was the importance of the rights of indigenous peoples
(ibid at 2).

21

Government’s Response, supra note 3 at 2. Furthermore: “[W]hile the Canadian
government can influence companies that are headquartered in Canada but
where officers are subject to domestic law, it has few mechanisms at its disposal
with which to influence companies that are headquartered abroad and managed
by non-residents but incorporated in Canada or listed on a Canadian stock exchange” (ibid at 3).
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be made conditional on companies meeting human rights standards
as recommended by the SCFAIT Report.22 Accordingly, other important means of encouraging CSR should be recognized, including
market-based incentives such as reporting on social and environmental performance through international reporting initiatives,
for example, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).23
The Government’s Response specifically disagreed with the SCFAIT
Report’s recommendations regarding the OECD Guidelines and the
NCP process. With respect to the process, the Government’s Response
stated categorically:
It is clear that the drafters of the OECD Guidelines did not intend the NCP
to play an investigative or quasi-judicial role in settling disputes. Rather,
the intention was to … facilitate a positive and constructive dialogue between multinational enterprises (MNEs) and those affected by their operations with a view to finding solutions to problems … [T]he non-binding,
voluntary nature of the Guidelines has significantly increased the ability
of like-minded governments to build greater international support than
would have been possible had the intention been to build an instrument
that was binding.24

With regard to the substance of the OECD Guidelines relating to
human rights, the Government’s Response suggested that the OECD
was not the most appropriate forum to clarify this issue, as OECD
members were largely developed states.25 In contrast, the UN Human Rights Commission was best positioned to address human
rights standards, for its membership was “drawn from all geographic
regions, including both developed and developing countries.”26
22

23

24
25
26

Ibid at 4. However, Export Development Canada (EDC) had already taken steps
to address human rights issues “such as involuntary resettlement, compensation,
public consultation and Indigenous peoples” as part of “environmental reviews
and political risk assessments” (ibid at 6). These commitments reflected changes
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s
Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits, which
in turn draw upon the experience of development banks, including the World
Bank Group. See OECD, Recommendation on Common Approaches to Export Credits
and Environment (Paris: OECD, 2007), online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/26/33/21684464.pdf> [Common Approaches].
Government’s Response, supra note 3 at 6-7. See Global Reporting Initiative (GRI),
online: GRI <https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx>.
Government’s Response, supra note 3 at 7.
Ibid at 13.
Ibid.
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Accordingly, the Canadian government was committed to working
with other states to clarify a human rights framework, notably
through support for John Ruggie’s work at the UN, and to incorporate “emerging conclusions” into the work of the OECD’s Investment
Committee.27
Arguably, the most controversial recommendation in the SCFAIT
Report was that Canada establish clear legal norms to ensure that
Canadian companies are held accountable for rights violations
outside of Canada.28 This recommendation arose in light of the
failed attempts by impacted communities to bring claims against
Canadian companies in Canadian courts alleging environmental
and human rights harms.29 The “failure” of these claims was not
with regard to their substance, which was never heard by the Canadian courts but, rather, with regard to their likely dismissal on the
basis of the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. While
the assertion of adjudicative jurisdiction by courts over civil actions
is clearly distinct from the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction
through legislation, these categories are not entirely without consequence for one another, as evidenced in the US context where
civil actions for violations of the law of nations have been made
possible due to the existence of legislation in the form of the Alien
Tort Claims Act.30
The Government’s Response asserted that “civil remedies may be
available to … foreign plaintiff[s] in Canadian courts” and, thus,
27

Ibid at 4-5, 13-14.

28

SCFAIT Report, supra note 1.

29

Sara L Seck, “Environmental Harm in Developing Countries Caused by Subsidiaries of Canadian Mining Corporations: The Interface of Public and Private
International Law” (1999) 37 Can YB Int’l Law 139 at 154-68 (discussing Recherches
Internationales Québec v Cambior Inc, [1998] Q J no 2554 (QL) (Qc Sup Ct)) and
168-74 (discussing the Mozambique doctrine); Seck, supra note 15 at 183-84 (discussing the Talisman litigation in US courts). See more generally Jennifer A Zerk,
Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006) at 124-27, 189-240; Craig Scott and Robert Wai, “Transnational
Governance of Corporate Conduct through the Migration of Human Rights
Norms: The Potential Contribution of Transnational ‘Private’ Litigation,” in C
Joerges, P Sand, and G Teubner, eds, Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Oxford: Hart, 2004) 287; Craig Scott, ed, Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Tort Litigation (Portland, OR: Hart
Publishing, 2001).

30

Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 1350 (2000) (providing subject matter jurisdiction for civil actions brought before US federal courts in relation to a modest
number of clearly defined norms recognized by the law of nations).
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that “Canadian corporations or their directors and employees may
be pursued in Canada for their wrongdoing in foreign countries.”31
However, the Government’s Response also acknowledged that, due to
the forum non conveniens doctrine, “Canadian judges may decide
that they should not exercise jurisdiction over a particular claim if
another court is better placed to hear the matter.”32 In terms of
prescriptive jurisdiction, the Government’s Response highlighted that
“Canadian law does not generally provide for extraterritorial application” as this could raise problems including “conflict with the
sovereignty of foreign states; conflicts where states have legislation
that differs from that of Canada; and difficulties with Canadian officials taking enforcement action in foreign states.”33 However, where
there was a “sufficient nexus” to Canada or “where the international
community has agreed … on the need for such jurisdiction,” Canadian law might provide for extraterritorial application.34
One proposal in the SCFAIT Report that the Government’s Response
did embrace was to hold multi-stakeholder public consultations on
problems arising from Canadian mining companies operating in
developing countries, with the intention of providing the SCFAIT
with recommendations not only for the Canadian government but
also for “NGOs, labour organizations, businesses and industry associations.”35 National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility
and the Extractive Sector in Developing Countries were accordingly
held in four Canadian cities from June to November 2006. An Advisory Group, composed of representatives of Canadian industry and
civil society, working closely with an inter-governmental steering
committee, issued a report in March 2007.36 The Advisory Group’s

31

Government’s Response, supra note 3 at 10 [emphasis in original].

32

Ibid.

33

Ibid at 9.

34

Ibid. Criminal law examples provided included: where there is a factual link
between Canada and the offence constituting a “real and substantial link” to
Canada, although whether asserting jurisdiction would “offend international
comity” must still be considered; and where the international community has
determined that certain offences are so important that “a country will have
jurisdiction to prosecute, regardless of where the acts took place, on the basis
of criteria established by treaty (such as the nationality of the offender or victim).”
However, there remains the question of whether “the relevant crimes can, as a
matter of international law, be committed by corporations” (ibid at 9).

35

Ibid at 3 (embracing a proposal in the SCFAIT Report, supra note 1 at 2).

36

Advisory Group Report, supra note 13.
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report consisted of extensive consensus-based recommendations,
which notably did not include a recommendation that Canada should
implement legislation to ensure that allegations of transnational
corporate wrongdoing could be heard in Canadian courts.37 Instead,
the Advisory Group’s report recommended that the government
develop a CSR framework composed of standards that Canadian
extractive sector companies operating abroad would be expected to
meet, reinforced through “reporting, compliance and other mechanisms,” including an independent ombudsman office and a tripartite
compliance review committee.38 The framework standards would
initially comprise International Finance Corporation (IFC) standards,39 supplemented by the Voluntary Principles on Security and
Human Rights,40 with a multi-stakeholder Canadian Extractive Sector
Advisory Group advising the government on both the implementation and further development of the CSR framework.41 The GRI
was recommended as the standard to be endorsed for the reporting
component of the Canadian CSR framework.42
Civil society participants in the Advisory Group had urged the
Canadian government to adopt federal legislation to regulate the
foreign operations of Canadian extractive companies in accordance with the CSR framework standards, which would be linked to
a civil liability system of enforcement.43 However, industry partici37

Ibid at 41-45. There was support for the Canadian government to “continue to
work with relevant law enforcement authorities to identify and remedy legal and
other barriers to the extraterritorial application of Canadian criminal law” and
to “[a]mend the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act to clarify that it applies extraterritorially to Canadian nationals” (ibid at xii, 45).

38

Ibid at iii; for details, see 8-24.

39

Ibid at 11-14 (stating also that the application and interpretation of these standards “shall observe and enhance respect for principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other related instruments” and that “[s]pecific
guidelines related to the application and interpretation of human rights principles will be developed”). See further International Finance Corporation (IFC)
of the World Bank Group, Sustainability Framework, online: <http://www1.ifc.org/
wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/IFC+
Sustainability/Sustainability+Framework/>.

40

Advisory Group Report, supra note 13 at 11-14. See further Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights, online: <http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/files/
voluntary_principles_english.pdf> [Voluntary Principles].

41

Advisory Group Report, supra note 13 at iv-v, 58-60.

42

Ibid at 15-19. See further GRI, supra note 23.

43

Advisory Group Report, supra note 13 at 42-44.
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pants argued that existing criminal and civil liability regimes under
Canadian law, combined with voluntary guidelines, were sufficient.44
Moreover, industry participants expressed concern that new regulation would “violate rules against extraterritorial legislation, interfere
with Canada’s foreign policy objectives and damage international
trade and investment.”45 Instead, the independent ombudsman
office would be “mandated to provide advisory, fact-finding and
reporting functions,” while the tripartite Compliance Review Committee would “determine the nature and degree of any company
non-compliance with the CSR standards.”46 Consideration was also
given to how access to government services could serve as a possible
incentive mechanism, and a number of government institutions
and initiatives that provide financing, insurance, or political services
to extractive companies were identified.47 It was further recommended that a CSR Centre of Excellence be created that could
“provide CSR information and advice to Canadian missions, Canadian companies, NGOs, affected communities, host governments
and indigenous communities,” while also serving to “promote
Canada as a country committed to CSR and to the sustainable economic and social development of the countries in which the Canadian extractive industry operates.”48
The Advisory Group’s report explicitly recommended that the
Canadian government “exercis[e] influence” within “relevant
regional and multinational fora to optimize the positive contribution of the extractive sector,” including by supporting and promoting CSR capacity building and advancing the rights of indigenous
44

Ibid at 42-44.

45

Ibid at 42.

46

Ibid at 23-24. This could include referral to an external dispute resolution process
(ibid at 21-23). The Advisory Group saw the OECD NCP as playing “an important
mediation role, a function that could not be assigned to the ombudsman’s office”
(ibid at 23).

47

Ibid at 46. These include the EDC, the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, the
Canada Investment Fund for Africa, Canadian International Development
Agency, and support provided through trade missions and Canadian embassies
(ibid at 47-49).

48

Ibid at 30-31. On the competitive advantage of CSR, the Advisory Group concluded: “[T]he reputation of meeting or even exceeding CSR standards can
offer extractive companies a competitive advantage and increase their overall
economic success. The social and environmental performance of Canadian
extractive companies can also reflect positively on the long-term success of
Canadian business as a whole” (ibid at 7).
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peoples.49 It further recommended that Canada continue to support
the ongoing work of the SRSG within the UN system.50 Ultimately,
the Advisory Group recommendations were passed along to an
inter-governmental Steering Committee, which was to pick from
the many recommendations a set of actionable ideas to present to
Cabinet for inclusion in a report that was to be sent back to the
SCFAIT. While the Advisory Group’s report was presented in March
2007, it took until March 2009 for the government to respond officially, perhaps due to the disparate government departments
involved as well as a federal election in October 2008.51 Notably,
the inter-departmental Steering Committee, chaired by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), included
representatives from Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), Environment Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, the Department of
Justice, Export Development Canada (EDC), and the Privy Council
Office.52 While the wheels of government were slowly turning, the
industry-civil society consensus behind the Advisory Group’s report
began to unravel.
Canadian Mining Internationally: From Bill C-300
to the Office of the CSR Counsellor (2009-11)
February 2009 marked the beginning of a very busy period for those
interested in Canada’s role in global mining. On 9 February 2009,
49

Ibid at 56. These include: the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals,
Metals and Sustainable Development; the World Mines Ministries Forum; the
Mines Ministries of the Americas; the African Mining Partnership; and the Global
Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (ibid at 54).

50

Ibid at 56. Further recommendations included that Canada endorse the Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights by becoming a participant country,
and formally participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by
becoming a supporting country while also encouraging Canadian extractive
industries to participate (ibid at 56-57).

51

In the interim, Canada became a supporter of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), online: <http://eiti.org/>. See Department of Finance
Canada, Canada’s New Government Supports an International Initiative to Improve
Governance in Resource-Rich Countries, News Release (10 February 2007), online:
<http://www.fin.gc.ca/n07/07-012-eng.asp>.

52

Advisory Group Report, supra note 13 at 2. The presence of representatives from
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada on the Steering Committee suggests a keen
awareness that the outcome of the roundtables process would not have implications only for Canadian companies engaged in mining internationally but also
for mining within Canada on First Nations lands.
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Bill C-300 was tabled in Parliament as a private member’s bill by
Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) John McKay.53 Just over a
month later, the government of Canada released Building the Canadian Advantage.54 One notable proposal in Building the Canadian
Advantage was to set up an Office of the Extractive Sector CSR
Counsellor to “enable” the resolution of “CSR disputes related to
the Canadian extractive sector active abroad in a timely and transparent manner.”55 Marketa Evans was appointed to the position in
October 2009,56 and she released the Rules of Procedure for the
CSR Counsellor’s review mechanism on 20 October 2010, just days
before the vote on Bill C-300.57
Further proposed legislation aimed at least in part at the global
activities of the Canadian mining industry was tabled in Parliament
on 1 April 2009 by New Democratic Party MP Peter Julian, in the
form of private member’s Bill C-354, An Act to Amend the Federal
Courts Act (International Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights).58 Unlike either Bill C-300 or the CSR Counsellor, the purpose of Bill C-354 was explicitly to address access to legally binding
remedies by non-Canadian plaintiffs for violations of international law.59 Possible claims that could be brought under Bill C-354
53

Bill C-300, supra note 14.

54

Building the Canadian Advantage, supra note 9.

55

Ibid at 10-11.

56

CSR Counsellor, Background, online: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade <http://www.international.gc.ca/csr_counsellor-conseiller_rse/
Background-Contexte.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=123&view=d>.

57

Canada, Rules of Procedure for the Review Mechanism of the Office of the Extractive
Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor (20 October 2010), online: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade <http://www.international.gc.
ca/csr_counsellor-conseiller_rse/assets/pdfs/rules_procedure-regles_procedure
-eng.pdf
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Bill C-354, An Act to Amend the Federal Courts Act (International Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights), 2nd Sess, 40th Parl (2009) [Bill C-354]. Previously known as Bill C-492, it had originally been introduced in Parliament on 10
December 2007. Subsequently, following spring elections in 2011, Bill C-354 was
reintroduced as Bill C-323 and received first reading in October 2011.

59

Ibid. Section 1 of Bill C-354 provided that section 25 of the Federal Courts Act,
RSC 1985, c F-7, be amended to explicitly provide the Federal Court with “original jurisdiction in all cases that are civil in nature in which the claim for relief
or remedy arises from a violation of international law or a treaty to which Canada
is a party and commenced by a person who is not a Canadian citizen, if the act
alleged occurred in a foreign state or territory or on board a ship or aircraft
registered in a foreign state while the ship or aircraft is outside Canada.”
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included those arising from a consistent pattern of gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights as well as violations of
various international labour and environmental rules.60 While Bill
C-354 itself made no specific mention of business enterprises, Peter
Julian explicitly linked it to increased corporate accountability in
his introductory remarks.61
Meanwhile, foreign plaintiffs alleging violations of their human
rights by mining companies linked to Canada were not waiting for
Bill C-354 to bring legal actions in Canadian courts. The courts had
not been enlisted to address these types of issues since the dismissal
with costs, on the basis of forum non conveniens, of an action brought
by local community plaintiffs in 1997 alleging severe environmental
harm due to the collapse of a tailings dam at a mine owned by
Cambior Incorporated in Guyana,62 although similar cases against
Canadian companies had already been argued in US courts.63 This
situation changed in March 2009 with the filing in the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice of a statement of claim, against Copper

Curiously, the insistence that “the act” occur abroad arguably limited the relevance of this amendment in situations where a Canadian company is involved
and the act may be characterized as relating to conduct by directors or officers
on Canadian soil, although this was likely not the intent.
60

Ibid at s 1(2).

61

House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 038 (1 April 2009) at 1520 (Hon
Peter Julian): “The bill would ensure corporate accountability for Canadian firms
operating abroad. It would broaden the mandate of the Federal Court so that it
protects foreign citizens against rights violations committed by corporations
operating outside of Canada.”

62

See the authorities in notes 29 and 30 and accompanying text. See also Bill C-354,
supra note 58, s 3, proposing amendments to section 50 of the Federal Courts
Act, supra note 59, which would amend the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens by preventing federal courts from staying proceedings “unless the
defendant clearly, cogently and convincingly establishes” that the Federal Court
of Appeal or the Federal Court is not a suitable forum in which to decide the
case, a more appropriate forum is available that will fairly and effectively provide
a final and binding decision, the more appropriate forum will likely provide a
final and binding decision in a timely and efficient manner, and the interests of
justice adamantly require that a stay of proceedings be granted.
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See, eg, The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy Inc, 582 F 3d 244 (2nd
Cir 2009) (upholding dismissal on summary judgment motion). Plaintiffs petitioned for writ of certiorari to the US Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, in October
2010, which was denied. See also Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v Placer Dome Inc,
582 F 3d 1083 (9th Cir 2009) (reversing dismissal on forum non conveniens and
act of state doctrine).
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Mesa Mining Corporation and the Toronto Stock Exchange, alleging
that the defendants were responsible for violence inflicted by security personnel at a mine site upon the plaintiffs, who opposed the
mine.64 By the time the dismissal of this action was upheld by the
Court of Appeal for Ontario in March 2011,65 another three lawsuits
alleging violations of human rights overseas had been brought in
Canadian courts against Canadian mining companies.66
Host state communities concerned about the conduct of Canadian-based mining companies operating in their backyards were
also increasingly making use of other Canadian mechanisms to draw
attention to their concerns. For example, a number of complaints
against Canadian mining companies were brought, from 2000 on,
to the Canadian NCP for the OECD Guidelines.67 These specific
instances included submissions made between 2009 and 2011 in
relation to mines in Guatemala, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, and
Zambia.68 In addition, concerned company shareholders, sometimes
supported by local communities from the host states, and sometimes
64

See Piedra v Copper Mesa Mining Corp, 2010 ONSC 2421 (Plaintiffs’ Statement of
Claim), online: <http://www.ramirezversuscoppermesa.com/statement-of-claim.
pdf>. The allegations against the TSX focused upon the listing of the company
in order to raise equity financing without any effort to prevent foreseeable harm
to the plaintiffs, who were engaged in peaceful protests.

65

Piedra v Copper Mesa Mining Corp, 2010 ONSC 2421, aff’d 2011 ONCA 191, 332
DLR (4th) 118.

66

See details of three cases launched in Ontario against Hudbay Minerals Incorporated in relation to the actions of security forces at mine sites in Guatemala,
as described on the website of counsel for the plaintiffs, online: Klippensteins,
Barristers and Solicitors <http://www.chocversushudbay.com/>. See further Choc
v Hudbay Minerals Inc, 2011 ONSC 4490. See also Association canadienne contre
l’impunité (ACCI) v Anvil Mining Ltd, 2011 QCCA 1035 [Anvil Mining] (accepting
jurisdiction to hear the case), but see Anvil Mining v Association canadienne contre
l’impunité (ACCI), 2012 QCCA 117 (determining that the case cannot be heard
in Québec).

67

Canada’s NCP, supra note 18; see also Canada’s National Contact Point (Specific Instances), online: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ncp
-pcn/specific-specifique.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=7>.
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Canada’s National Contact Point (NCP), Annual Report (Ottawa: Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2010) at s 8; Canada’s NCP, Annual
Report (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2011) at s 7. See also brief summaries of the four specific
instances considered by the NCP as of December 2008, all concerning mining
companies, online: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
ncp-pcn/specific-specifique.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=7&view=d>.
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not, drew attention to local community concerns over global mining
development through the use of shareholder proposals brought
forward at company annual general meetings held in Canada.69
Other complaints relating to CSR issues could have been filed, in
theory, with the office of the Compliance Officer for Export Development Canada, which was created in 2002. However, few complaints that were deemed to fall within the Compliance Officer’s
mandate were received.70
It is beyond the scope of this article to describe fully the considerable developments briefly noted here. Instead, the following discussion will focus upon the debate surrounding the highly controversial
Bill C-300 and contrast this debate with the initiatives that were
implemented by the federal government pursuant to the policy
paper Building the Canadian Advantage, most notably the creation
of the Office of the CSR Counsellor. The debate surrounding Bill
C-300 will illustrate the challenges facing even a mild law reform
proposal in this area, whereas examination of the Office of the CSR
Counsellor will demonstrate that even where home state non-judicial
mechanisms are adopted, industry consent is deeply embedded
within their structure.
bill c-300
Bill C-300 was designed to ensure that extractive sector companies
receiving support from the Canadian government act “in a manner
consistent with international environmental best practices and with
Canada’s commitments to international human rights standards.”71
69

See generally Aaron A Dhir, “The Politics of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice and Human Rights” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall
LJ 47; Johann A Klaassen, “Sustainability and Social Justice” (2011) 31 Issues in
Business Ethics 179 at 182-83. For specific discussion of the use of the shareholder
proposal mechanism in relation to Goldcorp’s Marlin mine in Guatemala, see
Shin Imai, Ladan Mehranvar, and Jennifer Sander, “Breaching Indigenous Law:
Canadian Mining in Guatemala” (2007) 6 Indigenous LJ 101; Aaron A Dhir,
“Shareholder Engagement in the Embedded Business Corporation: Investment
Activism, Human Rights and TWAIL Discourse” (2012) 22 Business Ethics
Quarterly 99.
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See Export Development Canada Compliance Officer, online: EDC <http://www.
edc.ca/english/compliance.htm>; EDC, 2009 Compliance Officer’s Annual Report
on Third Party Complaints, online: EDC <http://www19.edc.ca/english/docs/
compliance_officer_report_e.pdf> (noting that twenty-three complaints have
been received from third parties of which six fell within the compliance officer’s
mandate).
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The bill would have applied only to “mining, oil or gas activities”
located “in the territory of a developing country or on the high seas
where such activities are controlled directly or indirectly by a Canadian corporation.”72 Within a year of the bill coming into force,
the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of international
trade were to issue guidelines articulating corporate accountability
standards,73 after consulting with government departments or agencies, industry representatives, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), among others.74 The corporate accountability standards
were to incorporate social and environmental standards of the IFC75
and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,76 which
were both CSR standards proposed in the Advisory Group’s report.
They were also to incorporate “(c) human rights provisions that
ensure corporations operate in a manner that is consistent with
international human right standards; and (d) any other standards
consistent with international human rights standards.”77 However,
no specific reference was made to Protect, Respect, and Remedy, despite
it having been adopted by the UN Human Rights Council more
than six months earlier.78
Under Bill C-300, the ministers of foreign affairs and international
trade would have been empowered to receive written complaints
about Canadian companies or citizens in relation to mining, oil, or
gas activities in developing countries, which they would then have
been obligated (absent a determination that the complaint was
frivolous or vexatious) to assess for compliance with the corporate
72

Ibid, s 2(1). “Developing countries” were defined as “countries and territories
named in the list of countries and territories eligible for Canadian development
assistance established by the Minister of International Cooperation.” This definition proved problematic as there was no longer any such list. An amendment,
defining developing countries as those “classified as low income, lower middle
income or upper middle income in the World Bank list of economies, as defined
from time to time,” was subsequently proposed. Regarding proposed amendments, see House of Common Debates, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 66 (20 September
2010), Motion no 4, online: House of Commons <http://www.parl.gc.ca/
HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4656017&Language=E&Mode=1&
Parl=40&Ses=3 - SOBQ-3267199> (Hon. John McKay).
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Bill C-300, supra note 14, s 5.
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Ibid, s 5(3).

75

Ibid, s 5(2)(a).
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Ibid, s 5(2)(b).
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Ibid, s 5(2)(c)-(d).
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Protect, Respect, and Remedy, supra note 7.
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accountability standards.79 In doing so, the ministers would have
been able to consider information from the corporation or the
public, including witnesses from outside Canada, and results
were to be published within eight months following receipt of the
complaint.80 If a corporation’s activities were determined to be inconsistent with the standards, the ministers were to notify the EDC
and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB).81 According to Bill C-300, continued compliance with the standards was
to be a condition of any contract entered into by the EDC, and investment managers for CPPIB were to ensure that no assets were
invested in companies that were not in compliance with these
standards.82 Moreover, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act83 was to be amended to ensure that, with the
exception of ordinary consular services, no mining, oil, or gas
activities that were not in compliance with the standards would
receive support or promotion from the minister.84 Bill C-300 also
provided for amendments to the Special Economic Measures Act85
to allow for orders and regulations to be made restricting or prohibiting mining, oil, or gas activities in cases of grave breaches of
international peace and security or human rights.86
Many civil society groups and academics spoke out in support of
Bill C-300. For example, Bill C-300 was compared favourably to
proposals in the Advisory Group’s report in a report written by McGill
professor Richard Janda for the civil society coalition Canadian

79

Bill C-300, supra note 14, s 4(1)-(3), (5). The ministers would also be able to
examine a matter on their own initiative if they had reason to believe a company
had contravened the guidelines (s 4(5)).

80

Ibid, s 4(6). If a complaint was found to be frivolous or vexatious, reasons for
this determination were also to be published (ibid, s 4(7)).

81

Ibid, s 4(8).
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Ibid, ss 8, 10. However, proposed amendments would have greatly curtailed the
role of the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB). See House of
Common Debates, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 66 (20 September 2010), Motion nos 11,
16, online: House of Commons <http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/
Publication.aspx?DocId=4656017&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=
3%20-%20SOBQ-3267199> (Hon. John McKay).
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Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act, RSC 1985, c E-22.
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Bill C-300, supra note 14, s 9 (amending s 10 of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade Act, supra note 83).
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Special Economic Measures Act, SC 1992, c 17.
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Bill C-300, supra note 14, s 11.
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Network on Corporate Accountability.87 Supporters argued that Bill
C-300 would provide Canadian companies with a competitive advantage over others by providing a forum to address complaints88
and by requiring companies to respect human rights, thus reducing
the chance of operations being disrupted by local communities
experiencing unrest.89 This would, in the words of Toby Heaps,
provide a “maple leaf stamp of approval” as junior companies, encouraged to adhere to environmental and human rights standards,
could subsequently sell their properties for higher values, while
senior companies would experience fewer “headaches” as the junior
properties they acquired would have fewer messes to clean up.90
Moreover, if Bill C-300 led some of the worst performers to leave
Canada, Janda and others queried why Canadians should care.91
Some supporters suggested that most companies were already
adhering to the standards in Bill C-300, which were in effect preexisting de facto international standards due to financing requirements implemented by export credit agencies and banks following
the Equator Principles.92 While there was clearly some truth to the
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Richard Janda, Bill C-300: Sound and Measured Reinforcement for CSR — A Report
on the Legal and Policy Dimensions of Bill C-300 Prepared for the Canadian Network on
Corporate Accountability (September 2009), online: Canadian Network on Corporate Accountability <http://cnca-rcrce.ca/wp-content/uploads/Bill-C-300-Report
-Janda.pdf>.
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Ibid at 8-9; House of Commons, SCFAID , Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence,
40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 21 (3 June 2010) (Penelope Simons), online: House of
Commons <http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId
=4588646&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3#T1145> [Evidence (Simons)].
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House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 2nd
Sess, No 35 (27 October 2009) (Alex Neve), online: House of Commons <http://
www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4178126&Language
=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2#T0920> [Evidence (Amnesty — Neve)].
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House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 2nd
Sess, No 44 (3 December 2009) (Toby A.A. Heaps), online: House of Commons
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4292634&
Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2#T0945> [Evidence (Corporate Knights)].
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House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 2nd
Sess, No 32 (8 October 2009) (Richard Janda), online: House of Commons
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4134547&
Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2#Int-2885901> [Evidence ( Janda)]; Evidence
(Simons), supra note 88.
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claim that the standards incorporated in Bill C-300 were already
de facto requirements for mining internationally due to the requirements of project financing, the claim that international human
rights standards apply to corporate actors was highly controversial.93
Indeed, it was precisely because of the contested nature of this
claim that John Ruggie was appointed to the position of SRSG in
the first place.94
Many of the supporters of Bill C-300 were also aware of its limitations — notably, that it was best understood as a government accountability bill that would ensure government money did not go
to support unworthy corporate actors. For those seeking to punish
corporate offenders or remedy environmental harm or human
rights violations, Bill C-300 was far too limited.95 A few submissions

which serve as the baseline standards adopted by Equator Principles banks. See
House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 2nd
Sess, No 32 (8 October 2009) (Catherine Coumans), online: House of Commons
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4134547
&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2#Int-2885944> [Evidence (Mining Watch
Canada)]; Evidence (Amnesty — Neve), supra note 89. See also Equator Principles
Association, Equator Principles (June 2006), online: Equator Principles Association <http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles.pdf>
[Equator Principles].
93

Matthew DG DeBock, Roger R Taplin, and Adam D Wanke, Mining Law Update:
Bill C-300 (1 March 2010), online: McCarthy Tetrault, LLP <http://www.mccarthy.
ca/article_detail.aspx?id=4889>; Prospectors and Developers Association of
Canada (PDAC), Bill C-300 Myths and Facts (17 December 2009), online: PDAC
<http://www.pdac.ca/pdac/publications/na/pdf/091217-bill-c-300-myths-facts.
pdf> at 2; Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), FOCAL Views: A
Corporate Accountability Bill of No Avail (April 2010), online: FOCAL <http://www.
focal.ca/publications/focalpoint/235-april-2010-focal-views>.
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Corporations” (2007) 25 Company & Securities L J 30 at 33-37; Nina Seppala,
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Initiatives” (2009) 87 J Business Ethics 401 at 408; John Gerard Ruggie, “Current
Developments, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda”
(2007) 101 AJIL 819 at 821.
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Rights Action, “Bill C-300 Will Perpetuate Effective Immunity From Legal
Recourse in Canada” (20 October 2009), online: Rights Action <http://www.
rightsaction.org/articles/Analysis_Bill_C-300.htm>. See also House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 19 (25
May 2010) (Karin Lissakers), online: House of Commons <http://www.parl.
gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4547693&Language=E&
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grounded their support for Bill C-300 with reference to Protect,
Respect, and Remedy.96 Yet, as noted earlier, Protect, Respect, and Remedy
was not directly referenced by Bill C-300. Instead, Bill C-300 proposed a year-long consultation process to define the precise nature
of the human rights standards to be applied,97 a process that did
not satisfy industry representatives98 despite the ongoing engagement of global industry associations, such as the International
Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), with the problem of human
rights and global mining.99
Opposition from the Canadian mining industry to Bill C-300 was
fierce and premised on several key claims. First, some argued that
there were structural issues with the bill that would create practical
compliance difficulties or unfairness. For example, the Mining
Association of Canada pointed out that the bill would create problems for companies that acquired properties that were out of compliance, as no grace period was built in to allow for these properties

96

See Evidence (MiningWatch Canada), supra note 92; House of Commons, SCFAID,
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 19 (25 May 2010)
(Shanta Martin), online: House of Commons <http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4547693&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=4
0&Ses=3#Int-3174606> [Evidence (Amnesty — Martin)]; House of Commons,
SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 22 (8 June
2010) (Audrey Macklin), online: House of Commons <http://www.parl.gc.ca/
HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4598846&Language=E&Mode=
1&Parl=40&Ses=3#Int-3213529>.
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Commons <http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId
=4266713&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2#Int-2974648> [Evidence
(Kinross Gold)]. See also House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings
and Evidence, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 21 (3 June 2010) (Gary Nash), online: House
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to be brought into compliance.100 Second, it was claimed that the
bill would create a competitive disadvantage for Canadian companies, resulting in projects in developing countries either being developed by foreign competitors or not being developed at all, as
responsible companies would avoid projects that might constitute
a legal risk.101 Not only would Bill C-300 disadvantage Canadian
companies, claimed some industry lawyers, but it would also cause
100

House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 2nd
Sess, No 32 (8 October 2009) (Gordon Peeling), online: House of Commons
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4134547
&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2#T1005> [Evidence (Mining Association of Canada)]; see also House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings
and Evidence, 40th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 39 (17 November 2009) (Robert Wisner),
online: House of Commons <http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/
Publication.aspx?DocId=4231494&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=
2#Int-2948675> [Evidence (McMillan LLP)]. This issue was to have been addressed in the proposed amendments. See discussion in the text accompanying
note 108.
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40th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 42 (3 December 2009) (Robert Blackburn), online:
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“an exodus of companies from Canada” and thereby disadvantage
Canada itself as a mining jurisdiction of choice.102 Third, many
submissions claimed that Bill C-300 would violate the sovereignty
of host states, promoting a “West knows best” mentality.103 Finally,
the industry raised concerns that “anti-mining” groups who
launched complaints would be subject to no penalty for reputational
damage to companies.104
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Should be Withdrawn,” Republic of Mining (10 June 2010), online: Republic of
Mining <http://www.republicofmining.com/2010/06/10/canadas-very-flawed
-bill-c- 300-anti-mining-legislation-should-be-withdrawn-by-gary-nash>.
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House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 3rd
Sess, No 19 (25 May 2010) (Robert Anthony Hodge), online: House of Commons
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4547693
&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3#Int-3175079> [Evidence (ICMM)];
PDAC, The Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada Urges a House of Commons Standing Committee to Recognize the Ethically Responsible Nature of Canada’s
Mineral Industry and Reject Bill C-300, News Release (19 November 2009), online:
PDAC <http://www.pdac.ca/pdac/misc/pdf/091117-bill-c-300.pdf>; Evidence
(Canadian Chamber of Commerce — Beatty), supra note 101; House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 42
(26 November 2009) (Raymond Chrétien), online: House of Commons <http://
www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4266713&Langua
ge=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2#Int-2974947> [Evidence (Fasken Martineau
DuMoulin, LLP — Chrétien)]; Evidence (Canadian Council of Chief Executives),
supra note 101.

104

Evidence (Canadian Chamber of Commerce — Beatty), supra note 101; Evidence
(Canadian Council of Chief Executives), supra note 101; Evidence (Canadian
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Various federal government departments also weighed in against
Bill C-300. For example, government bodies named in the bill
complained that they had not been consulted and that confusion
would be created as the “legislative” approach adopted in Bill C-300
would be inconsistent with the policy approach to CSR being
adopted by government bodies — which might, for example, permit
a body such as the EDC to give money to a company and then engage it in raising its CSR standards.105 DFAIT, which would have
been required to implement the legislation, complained that it
would have to build capacity to investigate and adjudicate claims
due to the quasi-judicial process contemplated by Bill C-300.106 The
EDC reiterated industry concerns that Bill C-300 would create
competitive disadvantage for Canadian companies.107
The drafters of the bill were willing to acknowledge some of its
deficiencies, and a number of the complaints raised in relation to

Chamber of Commerce — George), supra note 101; House of Commons, SCFAID,
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 22 (8 June 2010)
(Thomas Shrake), online: House of Commons <http://www.parl.gc.ca/
HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4598846&Language=E&Mode=
1&Parl=40&Ses=3#Int-3213839> [Evidence (Pacific Rim Mining Corporation)].
105

House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 2nd
Sess, No 33 (20 October 2009) (Dr. Stephen Lucas, Minerals and Metals Sector,
Department of Natural Resources), online: House of Commons <http://www.
parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4148257&Language=
E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2#Int-2895130>; House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes
of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 35 (27 October 2009) (Jim
McArdle, EDC), online: House of Commons <http://www.parl.gc.ca/
HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4178126&Language=E&Mode
=1&Parl=40&Ses=2%20-%20T1000> [Evidence (EDC)]; House of Commons,
SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 39 (17
November 2009) (Donald Raymond, CPPIB), online: House of Commons
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4231494&
Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2%20-%20Int-2948327>; House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 39
(17 November 2009) (Ian Dale, CPPIB), online: House of Commons <http://
www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4231494&
Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2%20-%20Int-2948923>.
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House of Commons, SCFAID, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 40th Parl,
2nd Sess, No 43 (1 December 2009) (Grant Manuge, Trade Commissioner
Service, DFAIT), online: House of Commons <http://www.parl.gc.ca/
HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4281177&Language=E&Mode=
1&Parl=40&Ses=2%20-%20Int-2984517>.

107

Evidence (EDC), supra note 105.
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Bill C-300 were the subject of proposed amendments to the bill.108
Yet, ultimately, on 27 October 2010, by a close vote of 138 to 134, Bill
C-300 passed into history.109

building the canadian advantage and the office
of the csr counsellor
The policy paper Building the Canadian Advantage describes itself as
providing a “comprehensive strategy on corporate social responsibility for the extractive sector operating abroad,” informed by the
national roundtables and the SCFAIT Report.110 In keeping with its
name, Building the Canadian Advantage specifically claims that it will
improve the competitive advantage of Canadian international extractive sector
companies by enhancing their ability to manage social and environmental
risks. It recognizes that, while most Canadian companies are committed
to the highest ethical, environmental and social standards, those that lack
the commitment can cause harm to communities abroad and undermine
the competitive position of other Canadian companies.111

Accordingly, Building the Canadian Advantage first promises to support initiatives that enhance the capacities of developing countries
to manage the development of minerals, oil, and gas so that they
might benefit from these resources to reduce poverty.112 Second,
108

House of Common Debates, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 66 (20 September 2010), online:
House of Commons <http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.
aspx?DocId=4656017&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3%20-%20SOBQ
-3267199> (Hon. John McKay).

109

The vote tally, organized by party, is available online: House of Commons
<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HouseChamberBusiness/ChamberVoteDetail.aspx?
Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3&Vote=125&GroupBy=party&FltrParl=
40&FltrSes=3>. See also Jane Taber, “Ignatieff’s Mixed Messages on Mining
Leaves Liberal Heads Spinning,” Globe and Mail (28 October 2010), online: Globe
and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-notebook/
ignatieffs-mixed-message-on-mining-leaves-liberal-heads-spinning/
article1776539/>; Mining Watch Canada, Bill C-300 a High Watermark for Mining
and Government Accountability (16 November 2010), online: Mining Watch Canada
<http://www.miningwatch.ca/article/bill-c-300-high-water-mark-mining
-and-government-accountability>.

110

Building the Canadian Advantage, supra note 9 at 4.

111

Ibid [emphasis added].

112

Ibid at 4-5. The report highlights the role that CIDA has played in “building
and modernizing the governance regimes to ensure that natural resources are
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DFAIT and NRCan commit to promoting three “widely recognized”
international CSR performance guidelines — not surprisingly,
those identified by the Advisory Group — with Canadian extractive
companies operating abroad.113 Third, the Office of the CSR Counsellor is to be set up.114 Finally, a CSR Centre of Excellence is to be
developed to encourage the Canadian international extractive
sector to implement the voluntary performance guidelines by developing and disseminating high-quality CSR information, training,
and tools.115
With respect to international CSR performance guidelines, the
IFC Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability are described in Building the Canadian Advantage as “de facto
performance benchmarks for projects in developing countries that
require substantial financial investment,”116 due to their adoption
by financial institution signatories to the Equator Principles.117 The
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, developed
through a partnership of states, corporations, and NGOs in 2000,
are said to have been “designed specifically” to address the challenges
managed in a technically and environmentally sound manner,” including
through legal and judicial reform (ibid at 6.) Also highlighted is the role that
NRCan has played, at times with CIDA, in technical assistance, policy development, and training at the domestic level, while providing support for multigovernmental mining organizations and the establishment of the
Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (ibid at 6-7). See further, on the Intergovernmental Forum, online: <http://
www.globaldialogue.info/wn_e.htm> and note 263 in this article.
113

Building the Canadian Advantage, supra note 9 at 4-5.

114

Ibid.

115

Ibid. See further CSR Centre of Excellence, supra note 10.

116

Building the Canadian Advantage, supra note 9 at 8. The performance standards
“set expectations of conduct in eight issue areas, including Social and Environmental Assessment and Management Systems; Labour and Working Conditions;
Pollution Prevention and Abatement; Community Health, Safety and Security;
Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement; Biodiversity Conservation and
Sustainable Natural Resource Management; Indigenous Peoples; and Cultural
Heritage” (ibid).

117

Ibid at 8. Eighty percent of global financing for extractive sector projects is
provided by these institutions, which agree to adopt lending practices consistent
with the IFC performance standards (ibid); see also Equator Principles, supra
note 92. However, the Equator Principles specify that a different review process
applies to projects in high income OECD countries. See Equator Principles
Association, FAQs, online: <http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/
about-ep/faqs/42-about/frequently-asked-questions/21>.
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of “violence-related risk assessment,” including security provider
and extractive industry relations.118 The Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI), “developed ... via a multi-stakeholder process involving industry, investors, civil society and labour,” is characterized as “broadly
recognized as the de facto international reporting standard.”119
Yet, in terms of human rights, Building the Canadian Advantage
states:
Obligations under international human rights conventions apply to states
and do not directly create obligations for companies. While such obligations can serve to guide the development of CSR standards, the international legal environment is under pressure for change and adaptation.120

Building the Canadian Advantage highlights the UN Human Rights
Council’s unanimous endorsement in 2008 of Protect, Respect, and
Remedy, yet makes no reference to any of its three pillars or to what
these might mean for the Canadian government’s own responsibility
to address problems associated with Canadian companies engaged
in global mining. Nor is there mention of the international human
rights treaties to which Canada is a party. This appears to be a notable
omission, given Building the Canadian Advantage’s explicit reference
to Canada’s anti-bribery obligations as a state party to numerous
multilateral corruption conventions.121 The clear implication is that,
while Canada’s international anti-bribery commitments require it

118

119

120
121

Building the Canadian Advantage, supra note 9 at 9; Voluntary Principles, supra
note 40.
Building the Canadian Advantage, supra note 9 at 9. Building the Canadian Advantage also discusses the environmental disclosure requirements in place for issuers
listing on Canadian stock exchanges and the role of provincial securities laws
in relation to disclosure (ibid at 9-10). See also GRI, supra note 23; GRI, Reporting
Framework, online: GRI <https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/reporting
-framework-overview/Pages/default.aspx>; GRI, Mining and Metals Sector
Supplement, online: GRI <https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/
MMSS-Complete.pdf >.
Building the Canadian Advantage, supra note 9 at 8.
Ibid at 14, referring to the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 21 November 1997, Can
TS 1999 No 23 [Anti-Bribery Convention]; the Inter-American Convention
against Corruption, 29 March 1996, Can TS 2000 No 21; the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, 2225
UNTS 209; and the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 31 October
2003, 2349 UNTS 41.
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to address corporate conduct, its international human rights commitments do not.
Interestingly, legal incentives are proposed in the anti-corruption
context, with a commitment to “examine the possibility of extending the application of the offence of bribing a foreign public official”
under the Corruption against Foreign Officials Act122 “on the basis
of the active nationality principle.”123 While traditional bases of
jurisdiction that prevail in Canadian law are noted, there is no mention of the fact that Canada has been criticized for its reluctance to
implement nationality-based jurisdiction in the bribery context as
has been required for years under the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions.124 As a whole, the lack of reference to obligations
under international human rights law and the limited understanding of jurisdiction expressed in Building the Canadian Advantage
reflect a preoccupation with avoiding any exercise of either legislative (prescriptive) or judicial (adjudicative) jurisdiction that could
be perceived as an infringement of host state sovereignty.125
Building the Canadian Advantage identifies steps to “ensure that
government services align with high standards of corporate social
responsibility.”126 For example, CIDA will ensure that CSR is practised within the Canada Investment Fund for Africa by “assess[ing]
its procedures and guidelines related to projects involving Canadian
private sector partners.”127 The EDC already uses the OECD’s
122
123
124

125
126
127

Corruption against Foreign Officials Act, SC 1998, c 34.
Building the Canadian Advantage, supra note 9 at 14-15.
Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 121. See, eg, OECD Working Group on
Bribery in International Business Transactions, Canada: Phase 2: Follow-up Report
on the Implementation of the Phase 2 Recommendations on the Application of the Convention and the 1997 Recommendation on Combatting Bribery of Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (2006) at 5, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/5/6/36984779.pdf>. See also Julian Sher, “Canada Ranked Worst
of G7 Nations in Fighting Bribery, Corruption,” Globe and Mail (24 May 2011),
online: Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/
canada-ranked-worst-of-g7-nations-in-fighting-bribery-corruption/article
592312/; Transparency International, “Progress Report 2011: Enforcement of
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention” (2011), online: Transparency International
<http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/progress_report_2011_
enforcement_of_the_oecd_anti_bribery_convention>.
See generally Seck, supra note 15.
Building the Canadian Advantage, supra note 9 at 11.
Ibid at 11-12. Canada Investment Fund for Africa (CIFA) is a public-private investment fund designed to stimulate growth in Africa, with approximately a quarter
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Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export
Credits when developing policy and practices for evaluating the
environmental and social impacts of projects.128 Moreover, the EDC
is a signatory to the Equator Principles129 and issued a statement on
human rights in April 2008 committing to human rights due diligence for projects and countries determined to have a higher potential human rights risk.130 Building the Canadian Advantage also
notes the CPPIB’s Policy on Responsible Investing, along with the
CPPIB’s role as a contributor and signatory to both the UN Principles for Responsible Investment and the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative.131
Arguably, the most interesting proposal in Building the Canadian
Advantage is the creation of the Office of the CSR Counsellor, which
is justified on the basis that “[u]nresolved disputes directly affect
business through expensive project delays, damaged reputations,
high conflict management costs, investor uncertainty, and, in some
cases, loss of investment capital.”132 Accordingly, a CSR Counsellor
would enable CSR disputes related to extractive activity abroad to
be resolved in a “timely and transparent manner.”133 The position
was created by an Order in Council,134 and, in October 2009,

128

129

130

131

132
133
134

of its investments in six extractive sector projects. Four of these are operated
by Canadian or Canadian-listed companies. See CIFA, Portfolio Summaries, online:
CIFA <http://www.cifafund.ca/en/portfolio.html>.
Ibid at 12-13. See Common Approaches, supra note 22. See also generally EDC’s
environmental commitments, online: EDC <http://www.edc.ca/EN/About
-Us/Corporate-Social-Responsibility/Environment/Pages/default.aspx>.
Building the Canadian Advantage, supra note 9 at 13. IFC standards are also a
benchmark standard under the Common Approaches, supra note 22. However, the
EDC subjects G-7 countries to a streamlined approach, in keeping with the
Equator Principles, supra note 92 and EDC, Environmental and Social Review
Directive, para 29(c), online: EDC <http://www.edc.ca/EN/About-Us/Corporate
-Social-Responsibility/Environment/Documents/environment-social-reviewdirective.pdf>.
Building the Canadian Advantage, supra note 9 at 13. See EDC, Business Ethics:
Human Rights, online: <http://www.edc.ca/EN/About-Us/Corporate-Social
-Responsibility/Documents/human-rights-statement.pdf>.
Building the Canadian Advantage, supra note 9 at 3-14. See also the United Nations
Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI), online: UNPRI <http://www.unpri.
org/>; and note 51 on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
Building the Canadian Advantage, supra note 9 at 10.
Ibid at 11.
Order in Council, PC 2009-0422 (25 March 2009), online: <http://www.pco-bcp.
gc.ca/OIC-DDC.asp?lang=eng&Page=&txtOICID=2009-0422&txtFromDate
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Marketa Evans was appointed.135 The CSR Counsellor “report[s]
directly to and [is] accountable to” the minister of international
trade.136 The office officially opened in Toronto in March 2010.137
Before accepting complaints, the CSR Counsellor held public
consultations regarding the rules of procedure that should govern
her review process.138 Notably, the consultations were held not only
in Canada but also overseas and included stakeholders from “industry, civil society, host country governments and Canadian government officials.”139 The Rules of Procedure were released in October

=&txtToDate=&txtPrecis=&txtDepartment=&txtAct=&txtChapterNo=&txt
ChapterYear=&txtBillNo=&rdoComingIntoForce=&DoSearch=Search+%2F+
List&viewattach=20393>.
135

CSR Counsellor, supra note 56.

136

Order in Council, supra note 134, s 7(1). This structure has raised concerns as
to the ability of the CSR Counsellor to act impartially and at arm’s length from
DFAIT. See Meeting Summary Report: Legal Experts Meeting on ‘Identifying and
Exploring the Key Legal Issues Associated with the Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor (6 May 2010) at 6, online: DFAIT <http://
www.international.gc.ca/csr_counsellor-conseiller_rse/assets/pdfs/Legal
%20issues%20Workshop%201%20May%202010.pdf> [CSR Experts Report].

137

Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor, Building a Review Process for the Canadian International Extractive Sector: A Backgrounder
( June 2010) at 2, online: DFAIT <http://www.international.gc.ca/csr_counsellor
-conseiller_rse/assets/pdfs/building%20a%20review%20process%20back
grounder%20FINAL%20June%202010.pdf>.

138

See Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor,
Public Consultations Summary Report: Building a Review Process for the Canadian
International Extractive Sector: A Summary of Public Consultations Held June-August
2010 (September 2010) at 4-5, online: DFAIT <http://www.international.gc.ca/
csr_counsellor-conseiller_rse/assets/pdfs/Consultations%20Summary%20
Report%20Sept%202010.pdf> [CSR Consultations Summary], describing the
public consultations as consisting of “five separate but complementary activities:
(1) a series of full day, professionally facilitated workshops in 5 cities across
Canada; (2) a 90 minute interactive webinar; (3) formal and informal interviews
and dialogue sessions with international stakeholders in Mexico, Mali, and
Senegal; (4) an invitation to provide written feedback on the draft rules of
procedure; and (5) three legal experts workshops.”

139

Ibid at 2. See further individual consultation reports, online: DFAIT <http://www.
international.gc.ca/csr_counsellor-conseiller_rse/publications-publications.
aspx?lang=eng&view=d>. See also description of stakeholders in Office of the
Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor, Annual Report
to Parliament October 2009 – October 2010 (February 2011) at 3, online: DFAIT
<http://www.international.gc.ca/csr_counsellor-conseiller_rse/publications
-publications.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>: “[T]he Counsellor has spent much of
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2010,140 and, in April 2011, a Review Process Participant Guide was
unveiled, identifying six guiding principles: “accessible, effective,
independent, transparent, responsive, predictable.”141
As emphasized in the summary report of the public consultations,
the content of the Rules of Procedure was limited by the mandate
given to the CSR Counsellor in the Order in Council.142 According
to section 4 of the Order in Council, the CSR Counsellor is to both
“review” the CSR practices of “Canadian extractive sector companies operating outside Canada” and “advise on the implementation
of the performance guidelines.”143 Unlike Bill C-300, the possibility
of review is not limited to companies operating in developing countries. However, a Canadian extractive sector company is defined as
an “oil, gas or mining company that has been incorporated in
Canada or that has its head office in Canada.”144 Thus, companies
that list on Canadian stock exchanges, for example, are presumably
excluded without further connecting factors, despite the fact that
the GRI is included as a performance standard.145
the past year in conversations with the multitude of constituencies who have an
interest in the issues ... These stakeholders include Canadian companies, host
country authorities, project affected communities and individuals, joint venture
partners, Canadian industry associations, overseas industry associations, professional associations, Canadian NGOs, non-Canadian civil society groups, Canadian parliamentarians, host country regulators, service providers including
the legal and consulting communities, socially responsible investors, academics,
international financial institutions, global initiatives, and others.”
140

CSR Rules of Procedure, supra note 57; Office of the Extractive Sector CSR Counsellor, Launch of the Review Process of Canada’s Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate
Social Responsibility Counsellor, News Release (20 October 2010), online: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade <http://www.international.
gc.ca/csr_counsellor-conseiller_rse/launch_Oct2010_lancement.aspx?view=d>.

141

Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor, The
Review Process Participant Guide (April 2011), online: Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade <http://www.international.gc.ca/csr_counsellor
-conseiller_rse/assets/pdfs/Participant%20guide%20April%202011.pdf> [Review
Process Participant Guide].

142

CSR Consultations Summary, supra note 138 at 4.

143

Order in Council, supra note 134, s 4.

144

Ibid, s 1. This definition is repeated in the CSR Rules of Procedure, supra note 57, s 1.

145

For a typology of Canadian mining companies, categorizing them according to
their head office and government jurisdiction, among other factors, see DFAITCanada, Discussion Paper, Prepared for the National Roundtables on Corporate Social
Responsibility and the Extractive Sector in Developing Countries ( June 2006) at 26-27,
Table 2.
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More restrictively, the Order in Council provides that the CSR
Counsellor requires the “express written consent of the parties
involved” in order to undertake a review.146 Furthermore, she is not
permitted to make “binding recommendations” or “policy or legislative recommendations” or to “create new performance standards.”147 Nor may she apply any standards other than the designated
performance guidelines (the IFC Performance Standards, the
Voluntary Principles, and the GRI),148 together with the OECD
Guidelines.149
The CSR Counsellor may review a complaint if requested by “an
individual, group or community” that “reasonably believes” it is, or
may be, affected by activities of a Canadian extractive sector company that are inconsistent with the performance guidelines.150 More
strikingly, the CSR Counsellor may also review a complaint if approached by a Canadian extractive sector company that “believes
it is the subject of unfounded allegations concerning its corporate
conduct outside Canada in relation to the performance guidelines.”151 This provision was clearly designed to appease industry

146

147
148
149

150

151

Order in Council, supra note 134, s 6. The CSR Counsellor is also not to review
any activity that occurred before the day on which the first Counsellor was appointed (ibid, s 5(1)), which is identified in the CSR Rules of Procedure as 19
October 2009. CSR Rules of Procedure, supra note 57, s 3(a).
Order in Council, supra note 134, s 5(5).
Ibid.
Ibid, s 1. However, the NCP for the OECD Guidelines is to remain the “primary
authority” concerning these (ibid, s 5(2)-(4)). As the GRI is a voluntary guideline
for sustainability reporting, it is unclear how it could be used. One possibility
is that a community that believes it is being impacted by company conduct could
complain to the CSR Counsellor if it believes the company is not accurately
reporting CSR issues as required under the GRI. Another possibility is that a
concerned investor group could approach the CSR Counsellor, although it is
unclear whether an investor group would qualify as a “requestor.”
Order in Council, supra note 134, s 6(1)(a). An “individual, group or community” may authorize an “individual or organization” to aid or assist them in the
submission of a request for review, thus allowing for the possibility that Canadian
civil society organizations could assist foreign complainants in accessing the
review process. CSR Rules of Procedure, supra note 57, s 5(a). Anonymous requests
may not be submitted, although submissions may be made that request confidentiality (ibid, s 3(c)).
Order in Council, supra note 134, s 6(1)(b). Such a request must “clearly name
the Responding party.” CSR Rules of Procedure, supra note 57, s 5(b). Presumably
this responding party must then consent in writing to the review process under
section 5(6) of the Order in Council.
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concerns over “civil society” accountability, yet appears to be without
precedent in any similar non-judicial CSR dispute resolution mechanism. Finally, the CSR Counsellor is not on her own initiative to
review the activities of a Canadian extractive sector company, although she “may informally approach a company if ... she believes
that early dialogue could prevent a dispute from arising or
escalating.”152
The aim of the five-stage review process is “to foster constructive
collaboration and dialogue between stakeholders.”153 The CSR
Counsellor does have the discretion to refuse to deal with a request
for review,154 yet she must consider listed factors when conducting
a review, including whether the request was made in good faith.155
While submissions must be made in either of Canada’s official languages (French or English), the CSR Counsellor has hired Spanish
interpreters to conduct field visits in relation to the first complaint
received.156 The participant guide identifies the need for the requester to ensure that they have “adequate resources and capacity”
to continue the process through to its conclusion,157 yet no resources
are specifically designated to support a requestors’ capacity to engage
the process.
Once a review has been concluded, the CSR Counsellor is to issue
a “written public statement”158 and is also to submit an annual report
that is to be tabled in Parliament by the minister of international

152
153

154
155
156

157
158

Order in Council, supra note 134, s 6(2).
Ibid, s 6(3). The five stages are: (1) initial assessment; (2) informal mediation;
(3) fact finding; (4) access to formal mediation; and (5) reporting (ibid, s 6(4)).
Ibid, s 6(5)(a); see also generally s 6(5).
Ibid, s 6(6)(d); see also generally s 6(6).
CSR Rules of Procedure, supra note 57, s 9. See field visit reports concerning the
complaint filed by Excellon Workers, National Mining Union, and Proyecto de
Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales A.C. in relation to Excellon Resources Incorporated, online: DFAIT <http://www.international.gc.ca/csr_
counsellor-conseiller_rse/Registry-web-enregistrement.aspx?view=d> [Excellon
Complaint].
Review Process Participant Guide, supra note 141 at 17.
Order in Council, supra note 134, s 6(8). Before issuing the public statement,
the CSR Counsellor is to inform the parties of the result and share the statement
with the ministers of international trade and natural resources as well as the
minister of international co-operation if relevant. See section 6(9). According
to section 6(10), the minister of international trade may direct the CSR Counsellor to study additional matters.

84

The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 2011

trade.159 If an annual report “would reflect adversely on any person
or organization,” the CSR Counsellor is to give them an opportunity
to comment and “shall include a fair and accurate summary” of their
comments in the report.160 Ultimately, if the CSR Counsellor finds
that company operations are “inconsistent with the performance
guidelines,” the CSR Counsellor is to “make recommendations to
assist the company in ensuring that its activities are consistent.”161
No sanction follows, beyond the presumed shaming inherent in the
making of the written public statement.
The adoption of the Rules of Procedure and concomitant activation of the review mechanism was greeted with some enthusiasm
by industry representatives in the week preceding the vote on Bill
C-300, including the Prospectors and Developers Association of
Canada (PDAC)162 and the Mining Association of Canada (MAC).163
Civil society supporters of Bill C-300 were less enthusiastic, however,
noting that while the CSR Counsellor might be of some use in less
serious cases, companies were unlikely to consent to the process in
the case of more serious allegations, which represented the bulk of
complaints received by civil society.164 Moreover, it was argued that
the CSR Counsellor’s review process “lacks a transparent fact-finding
function and will lead to neither recommendations to government
159

Ibid, s 7(2).
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Ibid, s 8(2).
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PDAC, Canada’s Exploration and Mining Companies Welcome Canada’s Independent
CSR Counsellor, News Release (20 October 2010), online: PDAC <http://www.
pdac.ca/pdac/misc/101020.html>.
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Mining Association of Canada (MAC), Mining Association of Canada Welcomes the
Launch of the CSR Counsellor’s Review Mechanism, Press Release (20 October 2010),
online: MAC <http://www.mining.ca/www/media_lib/MAC_News/2010/
10_20_10_Press_Releaserev.pdf>.
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Canadian Network on Corporate Accountability, Civil Society Statement on CSR
Counsellor: Government’s New Toothless Review Mechanism Underlies Why Responsible Mining Bill C-300 Is Necessary, Press Release (26 October 2010), online:
Halifax Initiative <http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/content/civil-society
-statement-csr-counsellor>. According to the civil society statement, the most
common complaints received were “allegations of serious environmental pollution, collaboration with paramilitary networks and deliberate attempts to
corrupt government and the judiciary of the host country where the Canadian
company establishes its operations.” Moreover, as the CSR Counsellor mechanism “lacks an investigative function to clarify disputed facts,” it is unclear how
she would be able to resolve disputes without establishing first “whether the
allegations are well founded.”
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nor to sanctions.”165 As of December 2011, one review process begun
in relation to a mine in Mexico166 had concluded unsatisfactorily as
the company subsequently withdrew from the process.167 A second
request for a review had also been received.168
preliminary conclusions
The overview provided in the two preceding sections suggests that,
while there is a consensus that the federal government has a role
to play in preventing and remedying environmental and human
rights harms occurring at mines outside Canada with links to Canadian companies, there is no consensus at this point as to the scope
and structure of the relevant implementing mechanisms. For example, Bill C-300 would have applied only to mines in developing
countries, yet the CSR Counsellor may in theory respond to problems at Canadian mining operations anywhere outside of Canada.169
The CSR Counsellor’s reach is inherently limited, however, by the
requirement of all-party consent.170 There is also disagreement over
165

Ibid. See further MiningWatch Canada, The Government’s New ‘CSR Counsellor’
for the Extractive Sector, Newsletter 27 (5 January 2010), online: MiningWatch
Canada <http://www.miningwatch.ca/government-s-new-csr-counsellor
-extractive-sector>; JP Laplante and Catherine Nolin, “Snake Oil and the Myth
of Corporate Social Responsibility” (25 January 2011) 45:1 Canadian Dimension,
online: Canadian Dimension <http://canadiandimension.com/articles/3613/>.

166

See Excellon Complaint, supra note 156.

167

See Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor,
Closing Report, Request for Review File #2011-01-MEX (October 2011), online:
DFAIT <http://www.international.gc.ca/csr_counsellor-conseiller_rse/assets/
pdfs/Closing_report_MEX.pdf>.
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See complaint filed by Maître Ahmed Mohamed Lemine and others in relation
to First Quantums Minerals Limited, online: DFAIT Trade <http://www.
international.gc.ca/csr_counsellor-conseiller_rse/Registry-web-enregistrement.
aspx?view=d>. This request has since been closed.
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developed countries such as the United States. See UN Committee on the
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the content of the applicable standards and, in particular, whether
or not human rights specifically may or should be invoked. Similarly,
there are clear differences of opinion over the appropriate structure
of any non-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms, such as whether
they should have investigative or merely fact-finding powers, act in
an independent ombudsperson capacity,171 or, as with the CSR
Counsellor, serve a mediating role.172
More profoundly, it remains contentious whether legal sanctions
should be enforced against companies that are not prepared to
comply with applicable standards or whether respect for CSR standards should be “voluntary.”173 Yet even mild sanctions, such as the
removal of government support from non-compliant companies, is
seen as a major threat by industry and industry legal counsel, who
raise fears of an exodus of companies from Canada. Further, the
need to ensure access to legal remedies for victims of environmental
and human rights harms appears beyond contemplation once industry is at the table. And it is equally clear from the anti-bribery
experience that, even in the face of a clear multilateral commitment
to prohibit specified behaviour, the Canadian government is reluctant to implement legislative reform sanctioning transnational
corporate conduct. Clearly, Canadian government regulation facilitating binding remedies or punishment for CSR breaches by recalcitrant companies will not readily be forthcoming. The result is that
a non-judicial dispute resolution mechanism — one, moreover, that
would permit industry complaints against civil society — has emerged
as the government’s sole remedial response — a response best seen
as having the potential to prevent only minor harms and encourage
due to withdrawal by civil society and community groups frustrated by the
process.
171

Jyll Hansen et al, Canada’s Extractive Industry Ombudsperson: Background and
Recommendations for an Ombudsperson for Canadian Extractive Companies Operating Abroad: Brief Submitted to the Government of Canada Roundtables on Corporate
Social Responsibility in the Extractive Sector (November 2006), online: <http://
halifaxinitiative.org/updir/OmbudspersonMemo.pdf>.
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The government of Canada frequently states that compliance with identified
international standards is voluntary. However, the line between “voluntary” and
“mandatory” is generally understood to be less clear than this would suggest. See,
eg, Michael Kerr, Richard Janda, and Chip Pitts, Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Legal Analysis (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2009) at 93-104 (examining the voluntary versus regulatory debate and concluding that the debate is unhelpful).
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the equivalent of strategic litigation against public participation.174
While the CSR Counsellor is to be commended for her efforts to
achieve consensus on the functioning of the mechanism to which
she was appointed, the power and influence of her position is, ultimately, inherently limited.
Finally, it is striking how competing claims relating to competitive
advantage and disadvantage feature prominently in the discourse
documented earlier. Civil society generally claims that Bill C-300
would provide Canadian companies with a competitive advantage,
while industry opponents frame their critiques by asserting that Bill
C-300 would create a competitive disadvantage. The contested and,
at the same time, persuasive nature of competitive (dis)advantage
claims is highlighted by the significantly titled Building the Canadian
Advantage. Whether or not meaningful home state regulation of
transnational corporate conduct is politically feasible appears to
hinge greatly upon perceptions of the effects of such regulation on
competitive advantage. This point was highlighted in 2008 by John
Ruggie in Protect, Respect, and Remedy, to which we now turn.175
The UN’s Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework
and the Guiding Principles
introduction: protect, respect, and remedy and
the ruggie process
Prior to the appointment of John Ruggie as SRSG, the UN SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
had produced a set of draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to
Human Rights (Norms).176 The draft Norms were not adopted by the
UN Human Rights Commission, which, in 2004, described them

174

See recent Ontario report calling for legislation against strategic litigation against
public participation (SLAPP). Anti-SLAPP Advisory Panel, Report to the Attorney
General (28 October 2010), online: Ministry of the Attorney General <http://
www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/anti_slapp/anti_slapp_final_
report_en.pdf>. See also Barrick Gold lawsuit against small publisher in Quebec
(which has anti-SLAPP legislation), Barrick Gold Corp. c Éditions écosociété inc, 2011
QCCS 4232; and parallel lawsuit in Ontario, Banro Corporation v Éditions Écosociété
Inc, 2009 CanLII 7168 (ONSC).
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UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms
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as a draft proposal of no legal standing but that contained useful
elements and ideas.177 The SRSG’s appointment was designed to
“move beyond the stalemate” produced by the draft Norms, which,
while widely endorsed by civil society groups, were opposed by business and governments.178 Thus, when the SRSG was initially appointed, “there was little that counted as shared knowledge across
different stakeholder groups in the business and human rights
domain.”179 Accordingly, the SRSG “began an extensive programme
of systematic research,” resulting ultimately in “[s]everal thousand
pages of documentation” available on the Internet and actively disseminated.180 Among the research highlights of the first two phases
of the SRSG’s mandate were reports that provided a “scientific
mapping” of the position taken by the UN human rights mechanisms with regard to the obligations of both states and corporations.181

with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (26 August
2003). See generally John Gerard Ruggie, “Current Developments: Business
and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda” (2007) 101 AJIL 821.
177

Interim Report, supra note 6 at 55. See also David Weissbrodt and Muria Kruger,
“Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” (2003) 97 AJIL 901; David Kinley
and Junko Tadaki, “From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law” (2004) 44 Va J Int’l L 931.
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180

Ibid at para 4, referring to the SRSG’s web portal, online: Business and Human
Rights Resource Centre <http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRep
Portal/Home>.
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John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of
Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UNHRC, 4th Sess, UN Doc
A/HRC/4/35 (19 February 2007). Summary conclusions of this mapping
included: explicit recognition of the existence of direct legal obligations for
business under international criminal law, despite the lack of an international
forum to hear claims (ibid at paras 21, 19-32); explicit recognition that international law does not (yet) recognize direct legal obligations for business for
violations of less egregious international human rights law norms (ibid at paras
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He also conducted several legal expert consultations 182 and numerous multi-stakeholder consultations,183 touching upon various aspects of his mandate including the issues of whether corporations
have direct obligations under international human rights law, the
extent of the state duty to protect human rights, and the role of
states in conflict-affected areas.
In 2008, Protect, Respect, and Remedy was unanimously welcomed
by member states of the UN Human Rights Council.184 It is aimed
at all human rights185 and is designed to “assist all social actors —
governments, companies, and civil society — to reduce the adverse
human rights consequences of [institutional] misalignments.”186 It
identifies the “root cause” of the business and human rights problem

jurisdiction, and that this duty extends to protection against abuses by business
entities” (ibid at para 10). See also John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Addendum: State Responsibilities to Regulate
and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the United Nations Core Human Rights
Treaties: An Overview of Treaty Body Commentaries, UNHRC, 4th Sess, UN Doc
A/HRC/4/35/Add.1 (13 February 2007).
182

Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Addendum:
Corporate Responsibility under International Law and Issues in Extraterritorial Regulation: Summary of Legal Workshops, UNHRC, 4th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/4/35/
Add.2 (15 February 2007). The author attended the New York legal experts’
consultation.
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SRSG, Corporate Responsibility to Protect Human Rights: Summary Report on Consultation in Geneva (4-5 December 2007), online: Business and Human Rights Resource
Centre <http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-Geneva-4-5-Dec-2007.
pdf>; SRSG, The Role of States in Effectively Regulating and Adjudicating the Activities
of Corporations With Respect to Human Rights: Summary Report on Meeting in Copenhagen (8-9 November 2007), online: Business and Human Rights Resource Centre
<http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/Ruggie-Copenhagen
-8-9-Nov-2007.pdf >; SRSG, Business and Human Rights in Conflict Zones: The Role
of Home States: Summary Report of Consultation Co-convened by SRSG and Global
Witness in Berlin (5 November 2007), online: Business and Human Rights Resource
Centre <http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-Global-Witness-Berlinreport-5-Nov-2007.pdf>. The author attended the Copenhagen multi-stakeholder
consultation. See also links to summary reports of all consultations, meetings,
and workshops throughout the mandate, online: Business and Human Rights
Resource Centre <http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/
Home/Consultationsmeetingsworkshops>.
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today as “governance gaps created by globalization — between the
scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity
of societies to manage their adverse consequences.”187
Protect, Respect, and Remedy consists of three “differentiated but
complementary responsibilities”: the state duty to protect against
human rights abuses by business enterprises; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and the need for greater access by
victims to effective remedies. While the state duty to protect is described by the SRSG as lying “at the very core of the international
human rights regime,” the corporate responsibility to respect is
described as “the basic expectation society has of business in relation to human rights.”188 Access to remedies is also essential because
“even the most concerted efforts cannot prevent all abuse.”189
Protect, Respect, and Remedy notes that international human rights
treaty bodies recommend that states take all necessary steps to
protect against abuse by non-state actors, including prevention,
investigation and punishment, and provision of access to redress.190
The duty to protect has both legal and policy dimensions, and while
states have discretion in terms of how to implement this duty, both
regulation and adjudication are appropriate.191 However, home
states “may feel reluctant to regulate against overseas harms” either
because the “permissible scope of national regulation with extraterritorial effect remains poorly understood” or “out of concern
that those firms might lose investment opportunities or relocate
their headquarters.”192 In terms of the jurisdictional scope of the
duty, international law provides that states are required to protect
against human rights abuses by businesses “affecting persons within
their territory or jurisdiction.”193 Yet
[e]xperts disagree on whether international law requires home States to
help prevent human rights abuses abroad by corporations based within
their territory. There is greater consensus that those States are not prohibited from doing so where a recognized basis of jurisdiction exists, and
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the actions of the home State meet an overall reasonableness test, which
includes non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States. Indeed,
there is increasing encouragement at the international level, including
from the treaty bodies, for home States to take regulatory action to prevent
abuse by their companies overseas.194

Notably, the elaboration of the state duty to protect in Protect, Respect,
and Remedy focuses very much on the policy dimensions of the duty,
encouraging rather than mandating that they do more and never
chastising host states for their failures.195
The role of home states is also discussed under the access to
remedies pillar. Here, Protect, Respect, and Remedy outlines the problems that complainants have encountered when seeking judicial
remedies in home state courts, such as costs, lack of standing, and
the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens.196 The SRSG suggests that the “law is slowly evolving in response to some of these
obstacles” and concludes that states “should strengthen judicial
capacity to hear complaints and enforce remedies against all corporations operating or based in their territory, while also protecting
against frivolous claims.”197 The discussion of non-judicial remedies
also makes reference to home state mechanisms in the form of the
OECD’s NCPs and the OECD Guidelines.198 While the NCPs have
potential, Protect, Respect, and Remedy concludes that they fall short
of the requirements for credible and effective non-judicial mechanisms due to potential conflicts of interest, lack of resources, uncertain time frames, and lack of transparent outcomes.199 As with the
state duty to protect, the elaboration of the access to remedies pillar
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appears designed to encourage states to increase the availability of
remedies, through both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms,
rather than chastising states for not living up to their obligations
under international human rights law. Protect, Respect, and Remedy
concludes that the existing “patchwork of grievance mechanisms
at different levels of the international system, with different constituencies and processes” leaves “considerable numbers of individuals whose human rights are impacted by corporations [without]
access to [any] remedy.”200 While this situation is attributed in part
to a “lack of information,” the SRSG remarks, strikingly: “It also
reflects intended and unintended limitations in the competence and
coverage of existing mechanisms.”201
The third phase of the SRSG’s mandate consisted of an additional
three-year period to “operationalize” Protect, Respect, and Remedy
— “that is, to provide concrete and practical recommendations for
its implementation.”202 The SRSG was asked to proceed “in the same
research-based and consultative manner” as he had for Protect,
Respect, and Remedy.203 Of significance to the SRSG in embarking on
this next phase of his work was the fact that Protect, Respect, and
Remedy was “endorsed or employed” not only by individual governments but also by “business enterprises and associations, civil society
and workers’ organizations, national human rights institutions, and
investors” as well as “such multilateral institutions as the International Organization for Standardization and the [OECD]” and
other UN special procedures.204 He attributed the “widespread
positive reception” of Protect, Respect, and Remedy to both its “utility”
and “the large number and inclusive character of stakeholder consultations convened by and for the mandate.”205 Indeed, by the time
the draft Guiding Principles were being considered in January 2011,
“the mandate had held 47 international consultations, on all continents,” and the SRSG and his team “had made site visits to business operations and their local stakeholders in more than 20
countries.”206 The Guiding Principles were thus
200
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201
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informed by extensive discussions with all stakeholder groups, including
Governments, business enterprises and associations, individuals and communities directly affected by the activities of enterprises in various parts of
the world, civil society, and experts in the many areas of law and policy that
the Guiding Principles touch upon.207

In addition, some of the Guiding Principles were “road tested” and
thus provide “guidance informed by actual practice.”208 For example,
the Guiding Principles that address how governments should help
companies avoid being drawn into human rights abuses in conflictaffected areas “emerged from off-the-record, scenario-based workshops with officials from a cross-section of States that had practical
experience in dealing with these challenges.”209 Corporate lawyers
were involved in the corporate law project, in which more than
twenty leading corporate law firms from around the world assisted,
on a pro bono basis, to “identify whether and how corporate and
securities law in 39 jurisdictions currently encourages companies
to respect human rights.”210
The Guiding Principles themselves were “subject to extensive consultations,” first in October 2010 at sessions held separately with
Human Rights Council delegates, business enterprises and associations, and civil society groups, at which an annotated outline of the
proposals was discussed.211 In November 2010, a full draft of the
Guiding Principles and related commentary was “sent to all Member
States” and simultaneously “posted online for public comment”
until the end of January 2011.212
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the guiding principles
The Guiding Principles were presented to the UN Human Rights
Council on 30 May 2011. The report highlights that endorsement
of the Guiding Principles by the UN Human Rights Council would
“mark the end of the beginning: by establishing a common global
platform for action, on which cumulative progress can be built,
step-by-step, without foreclosing any other promising longer-term
developments.”213 Significantly, the normative contribution of the
Guiding Principles
lies not in the creation of new international law obligations but in elaborating the implications of existing standards and practices for States and
businesses; integrating them within a single, logically coherent and comprehensive template; and identifying where the current regime falls short
and how it should be improved.214

The Guiding Principles are structured in chapters following the template of Protect, Respect, and Remedy, with each pillar described as
“an essential component in an inter-related and dynamic system of
preventative and remedial measures.”215
Two foundational principles underlie the state duty to protect.
Principle 1 provides:
Ruggie-UN-draft-Guiding-Principles-22-Nov-2010.pdf> [Draft Guiding Principles].
The online consultation “attracted 3,576 unique visitors from 120 countries and
territories,” and “[s]ome 100 written submissions were sent directly to the Special
Representative, including by Governments.” The Draft Guiding Principles were
further “discussed at an expert multi-stakeholder meeting, and then at a session
with Council delegations, both held in January 2011.” Guiding Principles, supra
note 11 at para 12. For links to commentaries and submissions on the Draft
Guiding Principles, see online: Business and Human Rights Resource Centre
<http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Protect
-Respect-Remedy-Framework/GuidingPrinciples/CommentariesonDraft
GuidingPrinciples> and online: Business and Human Rights Resource Centre
<http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Protect
-Respect-Remedy-Framework/GuidingPrinciples/Submissions> [Submissions
to Consultations on Draft Guiding Principles].
213
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States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/
or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This
requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and
redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and
adjudication.216

According to Principle 2, “[s]tates should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/
or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations.”217
The commentary to Principle 2 begins with a statement reminiscent
of the uncertainty identified in Protect, Respect, and Remedy regarding
the permissibility of home state regulation despite a lack of obligation under international human rights law.218 However, the commentary also notes the existence of strong “policy reasons” for home
states to clearly set out expectations, in particular, where the state
is either involved in the business or supports it, in part so as to preserve the reputation of the home state itself.219 Moreover, the commentary highlights that a range of approaches have been adopted
by states to date including both “domestic measures with extraterritorial implications”220 and “direct extraterritorial legislation
216

Ibid at 6, Principle 1. The chapter outlining the state duty to protect is described
as focused upon preventative measures (ibid at 7). As the state duty to protect
is a standard of conduct, states are not “per se responsible for human rights
abuse by private actors” but, rather, “may breach their international human
rights law obligations where such abuse can be attributed to them” or where
they “fail to take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress
private actors’ abuse” (ibid at 7, Commentary to Principle 1).
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Ibid. These measures include “requirements on ‘parent’ companies to report
on the global operations of the entire enterprise; multilateral soft-law instruments such as the [OECD] Guidelines; and performance standards required
by institutions that support overseas investments.” The distinction between
measures with extraterritorial effect and direct extraterritorial measures was
first introduced by the SRSG in a keynote address in Stockholm in November
2009 and elaborated upon in his 2010 report. See John G Ruggie, Keynote Presentation at EU Presidency Conference on the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework,
Stockholm, 10-11 November 2009, online: <http://www.reports-and-materials.
org/Ruggie-presentation-Stockholm-10-Nov-2009.pdf>; John Ruggie, Report of
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises: Business and Human
Rights: Further Steps toward the Operationalization of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy,
UNHRC, 14th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/14/27 (9 April 2010) at para 48.
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and enforcement.”221 The commentary concludes that a variety of
factors “contribute to the perceived and actual reasonableness of
States’ actions,” including whether they are “grounded in multilateral agreement.”222
Following these foundational principles, the chapter outlining
the state duty to protect presents a series of operational principles
categorized within four overarching themes. The first theme on
“general state regulatory and policy functions” highlights both
Principle 3 on the importance of enforcement and periodic assessment of the adequacy of existing laws and the need to ensure that
“laws and policies governing the creation and ongoing operation
of business enterprises, such as corporate law, do not constrain but
enable business respect for human rights.”223 The principle elaborates on the need for states to provide businesses with “effective
guidance” on “how to respect human rights throughout their
operations” and to “[e]ncourage or where appropriate require,
business enterprises to communicate how they address their human
rights impacts.”224
The second theme on “the state-business nexus” encompasses
Principles 4, 5, and 6.225 According to Principle 4, states should “take
additional steps” when business enterprises are “owned or controlled
by the State” or “receive substantial support and services from State
agencies,” including export credit agencies and official investment
insurance or guarantee agencies.226 These additional steps may include “requiring human rights due diligence.”227 The third theme,
“supporting business respect for human rights in conflict-affected
areas,” is addressed in Principle 7 and consists of four recommendations for states due to the heightened risk of gross human rights
abuses in conflict zones.228 These include: engaging with businesses
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to help them “identify, prevent and mitigate” human rights-related
risks at the “earliest stage possible”; providing “adequate assistance
to business enterprises to assess and address the heightened risks”;
“denying access to public support and services” where a business
enterprise involved in gross human rights abuses refuses to cooperate; and ensuring that the risks of business involvement in gross
human rights abuses are effectively addressed by “current policies,
legislation, regulations and enforcement measures.”229
“Ensuring policy coherence,” which is the fourth and final theme
under the state duty to protect, is addressed in Principles 8 through
10. Most relevant to home states is Principle 8, according to which
“governmental departments, agencies or State-based institutions
that shape business practices” need to be “aware of and observe the
State’s human rights obligations” when fulfilling their mandates.230
Finally, Principle 10 provides that, as members of multilateral institutions, states should promote business respect for human rights
by helping other states meet their duty to protect through “technical
assistance, capacity-building and awareness-raising” while also drawing upon the Guiding Principles to promote “shared understandings”
and “advance international co-operation” on business and human
rights.231
The role of home states is also considered in the final chapter of
the Guiding Principles, “Access to Remedy.” A single foundational
principle, Principle 25, informs the chapter:
As part of their duty to protect against business-related human rights abuse,
States must take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, that when such abuses occur
within their territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to
effective remedy.232
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Ibid at 10-11, Principle 7. See also Conflict-Affected Regions, supra note 209.
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Guiding Principles, supra note 11 at 11, Principle 8. Principle 9 highlights the
need for states to maintain “adequate domestic policy space” and regulatory
ability to meet their own human rights obligations, even when pursuing investment treaties or contracts with other States or business enterprises( ibid at 12,
Principle 9).
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Ibid at 12, Principle 10. Principle 10 further provides that as members of multilateral institutions dealing with business-related issues, States should ensure that
the institutions do not “restrain the ability of their member States to meet their
duty to protect.”
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The commentary elaborates that access to effective remedies includes both “procedural and substantive aspects” and that remedies may include “apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, financial
or non-financial compensation and punitive sanctions (whether
criminal or administrative, such as fines), as well as the prevention
of harm through, for example, injunctions or guarantees of nonrepetition.”233 The term “grievance” is defined as “a perceived injustice evoking an individual’s or a group’s sense of entitlement,”
while “grievance mechanism” is used “to indicate any routinized,
State-based or non-State-based, judicial or non-judicial process”
through which grievances “can be raised and remedy can be
sought.”234
Five operational principles appear under the chapter “Access to
Remedy.” Principle 26 on “state-based judicial mechanisms,” provides that states should “ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial
mechanisms” by considering how to reduce legal and other barriers
that “could lead to a denial of access to remedy.”235 The commentary
highlights the importance of states ensuring that they do not “erect
barriers to prevent legitimate cases from being brought before the
courts” and ensuring that the “legitimate and peaceful activities of
human rights defenders are not obstructed.”236 Principle 27 on
“state-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms,” suggests that
“alongside judicial mechanisms,” states should “provide effective
and appropriate non-judicial grievance mechanisms … as part of
a comprehensive State-based system for the remedy of businessrelated human rights abuse.”237 The commentary notes that a judicial remedy is not always required nor is it always the approach
favoured by claimants “even where judicial systems are effective
and well-resourced.” Consequently, there is an essential role for
administrative, legislative, and other non-judicial mechanisms as a
complement and supplement to judicial mechanisms.238
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Principles 28 to 30 address “non-state grievance mechanisms.”
Principle 28 highlights that states should play a role in facilitating
access to effective non-state-based grievance mechanisms.239 The
commentary identifies two different categories of non-state-based
grievance mechanisms: first, those “administered by a business
enterprise alone or with stakeholders, by an industry association or
a multi-stakeholder group”240 and, second, “regional and international human rights bodies,” which, while most often dealing
with “alleged violations by States of their obligations to respect
human rights,” have also at times dealt with the “failure of a State
to meet its duty to protect against human rights abuse by business
enterprises.”241 This commentary is striking for several reasons.
Positively, it highlights that access to remedies may include remedies
against the state rather than against the business enterprise alone,
as appears implicit in the rest of the “Access to Remedy” chapter.242
However, by categorizing regional and international human rights
mechanisms as non-state-based grievance mechanisms rather than
enforcers of international law, the Guiding Principles curiously appear to equate such mechanisms with private company or industry
grievance mechanisms.
Principle 31, the final principle under the “Access to Remedy”
chapter, outlines “effectiveness criteria for non-judicial grievance
mechanisms” and is applicable to both state-based and non-statebased mechanisms.243 To be effective, grievance mechanisms should
239

Ibid at 24, Principle 28. Principle 29 then focuses upon the need for business
enterprises to “establish or participate in effective operational-level grievance
mechanisms for individuals and communities” in order to address and remediate grievances early on, while Principle 30 provides that “collaborative initiatives
that are based on respect for human rights-related standards,” whether industry
or multi-stakeholder, should “ensure that effective grievance mechanisms are
available” in order to achieve greater legitimacy (ibid at 25-26).
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be: (1) legitimate;244 (2) accessible;245 (3) predictable;246 (4) equitable;247 (5) transparent;248 (6) rights-compatible;249 and (7) a source
of continuous learning.250 Operational grievance mechanisms
should also be “[b]ased on engagement and dialogue,” including
by “consulting stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended
on their design and performance.”251
preliminary conclusions
In sum, the Guiding Principles do not definitively state that home
states have binding obligations under international human rights
law to regulate and adjudicate transnational corporations so as to
prevent and remedy human rights harms. However, they do provide
guidance as to the types of measures that all states should implement to prevent and remedy business harms and so can serve as a
useful tool for evaluating the recent Canadian developments described earlier with regard to global mining. Further reflection on
how the “Ruggie process” informed the substance of his conclusions
on the existence and scope of home state obligations will be provided in the following section.
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Ibid. Legitimate means “enabling trust from the stakeholder groups for whose
use they are intended, and being accountable for the fair conduct of grievance
processes.”
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they are intended, and providing adequate assistance for those who may face
particular barriers to access.”
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Ibid. Equitable means “seeking to ensure that aggrieved parties have reasonable
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grievance process on fair, informed and respectful terms.”
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Ibid. Transparent means “keeping parties to a grievance informed about its
progress, and providing sufficient information about the mechanism’s performance to build confidence in its effectiveness and meet any public interest at
stake.”
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Ibid. Rights-compatible means “ensuring that outcomes and remedies accord
with internationally recognized human rights.”
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lessons for improving the mechanism and preventing future grievances and
harms.”
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Discussion
canada, global mining, and the guiding principles
The Guiding Principles use permissive language in making several
recommendations relating to the home state duty to protect rights.
Thus, Principle 3(a) indicates that states “should” enforce laws
requiring business enterprises to respect rights and review existing
laws to identify and address any gaps. The Canadian roundtables
process could qualify as a review of the adequacy of Canadian laws
relating to global mining. Its multi-stakeholder approach, mirroring
in some ways that of the SRSG’s process, might even be viewed as
commendable. Principle 3(b) identifies the need to ensure that
corporate laws do not constrain business respect for human rights.
Recent developments in Canadian corporate law suggest that some
steps may have been taken to make director fiduciary duties more
human rights friendly,252 while shareholder proposals reflecting
affected community concerns may now be brought to annual general meetings with greater ease than in the past.253 However, there
is no guarantee that these proposals will influence decision
making.254
Principle 3(c)’s recommendation that states provide further guidance to businesses on “how to respect human rights throughout
their operations” is met at least in part by the existence of the Centre
of Excellence for CSR, although as noted earlier in this article, the
list of CSR standards to which the centre refers companies does
not include Protect, Respect, and Remedy or the Guiding Principles.255
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See BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560. For related
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(September 2009), online: Business and Human Rights Resource Centre
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Principle 3(d) calls upon states to encourage or even require business enterprises to communicate how they address their human
rights impacts. This recommendation may be partially met by the
inclusion of the GRI as a performance standard for the CSR Counsellor,256 although there have also been calls for increased social
disclosure under securities laws in Ontario.257
The EDC’s human rights and environmental policies may be in
keeping with Principle 4’s recommendation that human rights impact assessments be conducted when states provide substantial
support or services to business ventures.258 However, no similar
requirement exists in relation to other government support such
as that provided through Canadian missions abroad, despite such
a proposal in Bill C-300. Moreover, unlike Bill C-300, the Guiding
Principles do not suggest that this financing or support should be
made conditional upon company compliance with human rights
standards. The one exception is where enterprises engaged in gross
human rights abuses in conflict-affected areas refuse to co-operate
to address the situation.259 Yet even in this seemingly extreme case,
Canada has not adopted conditionality.
Other recommendations in Principle 7(a) and (b) concern engagement with, and assistance to, business enterprises that are at
a heightened risk of committing abuses so that they might identify,
prevent, and mitigate these risks. These recommendations may be
partially addressed by the inclusion of the Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights in the CSR Counsellor’s mandate.260
Principle 7(d) also proposes that states ensure that their policies,
legislation, regulations, and enforcement measures are effective in
addressing these risks. The possibility of “civil, administrative or
criminal liability for enterprises domiciled or operating in” a state’s
256
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20091218_51-717_mof-rpt.pdf>; Hennick Centre for Business and Law and JantziSustainalytics, Corporate Social Reporting Initiative: Report to Minister of Finance
( June 2010) at 8, online: Hennick Centre <http://www.hennickcentre.ca/
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territory and/or jurisdiction that contribute to gross human rights
abuses is raised here, a possibility that may, or, more likely, may
not be met in Canada.261 Effective enforcement remains unlikely
given Canada’s historically poor enforcement record in the bribery
context.
Principle 8’s recommendation that government departments
achieve policy coherence with state human rights commitments
may be partially met by the existence of federal department CSR
policies.262 Finally, Principle 10’s emphasis on multilateral engagement through multilateral institutions, including technical assistance, capacity building, and “awareness-raising” may be met by
Canada’s leadership role in the Intergovernmental Forum on
Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development.263
The role of the home state is also addressed in the Guiding Principles under “Access to Remedy” chapter. In terms of access to
judicial remedies, as discussed earlier, there have been no recent
legislative changes to facilitate this recourse,264 although it remains
to be seen whether courts will themselves begin to embrace this
type of litigation, at least by not exercising their discretion to
decline to hear such cases.265 While increasing numbers of nonjudicial mechanisms have been implemented, it appears unlikely
261

See James Yap, “Corporate Civil Liability for War Crimes in Canadian Courts:
Lessons from Bil’in (Village Council) v. Green Park International Ltd.” (2010)
8 J Int’l Crim Justice 631; W. Cory Wanless, “Corporate Liability for International
Crimes under Canada’s Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act” (2009)
7 J Int’l Criminal Justice 201.
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See, eg, the list of government departments with links to CSR policies on the
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MenuPage.cfm?sections=126&menu=131#block253>.
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See further on the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and
Sustainable Development, supra note 112. However, another view of the Intergovernmental Forum and other capacity-building exercises in developing
countries would be that these are designed to facilitate the exploitation of host
state natural resources to benefit Canadian companies. See, eg, critical commentary surrounding the support provided by CIDA to “development NGOs”
for “CSR projects” of mining companies at mine sites overseas by Catherine
Coumans, Brief Prepared for the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs and International Development’s Study on the Role of the Private Sector in
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January 2012), online: MiningWatch Canada <http://www.miningwatch.ca/
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that any would meet the list of effectiveness criteria outlined in
Principle 31.266
This review would not be complete without acknowledging the
influence of the SRSG’s contributions to other international standards referenced by Canadian government mechanisms. For example, the most recent version of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, released in May 2011, includes a new
chapter on human rights designed to reflect the recommendations
in Protect, Respect, and Remedy and the Guiding Principles.267 Greater
attention was also paid to the design of the NCP process in order
to better reflect the recommendations of the SRSG.268 There is
pressure from human rights advocates for the OECD to take human
rights into account in the current review of the OECD Recommendation on Export Credits and the Environment.269 The most recent
revisions to the IFC’s Sustainability Framework and Policies and
Procedures, dating from May 2011, also include increased references
to human rights, although it may be debated whether they are sufficiently aligned with Protect, Respect, and Remedy and the Guiding
Principles to satisfy the SRSG himself.270 On 23 March 2011, the GRI
266

In this regard, it is interesting to compare the Guiding Principles’ list of criteria,
supra notes 243-51 with the list of claims made by the Office of the Extractive
Sector CSR Counsellor, supra note 140.
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See generally materials on the update process on the OECD website, online:
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released the latest revised and updated GRI reporting standards,
the G3.1 Guidelines, which explicitly incorporate human rights
reporting.271 Thus, even without explicit reference to Protect, Respect,
and Remedy or the Guiding Principles, Canada’s promotion of other
international standards will increasingly include a human rights
component — although it appears unlikely to be in a legally binding form.
international law and corporate power
Protect, Respect, and Remedy has been described as a polycentric governance framework, an attempt to “build simultaneous public and
private governance systems as well as coordinate, without integrating, their operations.”272 This article has sought to determine what
role is envisioned within this framework for home states in regulating
and adjudicating to prevent and remedy human rights harms, and
how measures implemented by the Canadian government measure
up to the Guiding Principles. As seen earlier, Canadian practice is
clearly not fully consistent with the Guiding Principles. However, a
bigger question is why the Guiding Principles themselves frame the
home state duty to protect in suggestive terms rather than as a binding legal obligation under international human rights law.273 From
a legal perspective, the Guiding Principles are curious. While they
have received a significant amount of support, many international
human rights lawyers are critical of their substance.274
Sustainability Framework was released in May 2011 (online: IFC <http://www.
ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf>) and includes revisions to the Policies and
Performance Standards (online: IFC <http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.
nsf#SF>. See full text of revised Sustainability Framework, online: IFC <http://
www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Updated_IFC_
SFCompounded_August1-2011/$FILE/Updated_IFC_SustainabilityFramework
Compounded_August1-2011.pdf >.
271

For text see online: GRI <https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/latest
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Initiative, G3.1 Guidelines: Human Rights — Current Project Status, online: GRI
<http://www.globalreporting.org/reportingframework/g31guidelines/
guidelines.htm> (stating that revisions address Ruggie’s work).
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It is worth reflecting on the substance of the Guiding Principles in
light of the process used to formulate them. Rather than ignoring
the reality of corporate power, the SRSG pragmatically chose to
engage it. The idea that multi-stakeholder engagement is an essential tool of global governance is guided by Ruggie’s contributions
as a constructivist international relations scholar, notably in his
recognition of a “newly emerging global public domain that is no
longer coterminous with the system of states.”275 Defined as an
“institutionalized arena of discourse, contestation and action organized around the production of global public goods,” the global
public domain is “constituted by interactions among non-state actors
as well as states.”276 Ruggie suggests that the development of new
non-territorial political spaces may create a more inclusive institutional arena in which the global public domain is equated not simply
with states and the interstate realm but also includes non-state actors
such as civil society organizations, transnational corporations, and
international organizations.277 This new global public domain does
Human Rights Resource Centre <http://www.business-humanrights.org/
Documents/UNGuidingPrinciples/Commentaries>, in particular the critical
commentary from the Child Rights Information Network (21 June 2011), International Federation for Human Rights (17 June 2011), and Human Rights Watch
(16 June 2011). See also Penelope Simons, “International Law’s Invisible Hand
and the Future of Corporate Accountability for Violations of Human Rights”
(2012) 3 J Human Rights & the Environment 5, online: Edward Elgar Publishing
<http://e-elgar.metapress.com/content/uq8l85545870m334/fulltext.pdf>. See
also David Bilchitz, “The Ruggie Framework: An Adequate Rubric for Corporate
Human Rights Obligations?” (2010) 7 Sur Int’l J Human Rights 199; Robert
McCorquodale, “Corporate Social Responsibility and International Human
Rights Law” (2009) 87 J Business Ethics 385.
275
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Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International
Relations” (1993) 47 Int’l Org 139; John G Ruggie, “What Makes the World
Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge”
(1998) 52 Int’l Org 855. For a complete list of Ruggie’s academic work, see
online: Harvard University <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/johnruggie/
index.html>.
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not “replace states,” but its effect is to “embed systems of governance in broader global frameworks of social capacity and agency.”278
With this in mind, it is worth considering Principles 1 and 2 of the
Guiding Principles anew and what they might mean for home state
obligations in the human rights realm. While Principle 1 indicates
that “States must protect against human rights abuse within their
territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties,” Principle 2 provides
that “States should set out clearly the expectation that all business
enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect
human rights throughout their operations.” The somewhat curious
choice of language in the two principles differs slightly from the
wording that appeared in the draft Guiding Principles.279 Notably,
Principle 2 of the draft Guiding Principles was extensively critiqued
in submissions by industry, civil society, and academic commentators.280 Generally speaking, civil society commentators, joined by
many academics, were concerned that the use of “should encourage”
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Ibid at 519. Ruggie describes the global public domain as “exist[ing] in transnational non-territorial spatial formations” and being “anchored in norms and
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treaties. See Guiding Principles: supra note 11 at 6-7. It does, however, include a
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and by providing adequate accountability, legal certainty, and procedural and
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related legal entities.” See Draft Guiding Principles, supra note 212 [emphasis added],
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in draft Principle 2 was not strong enough given the importance of
“extraterritorial” home state regulation as a tool to fill global governance gaps. Moreover, it did not accurately reflect the absence
of jurisdictional limits in international human rights instruments
such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.281 Industry submissions, on the other hand, including
submissions from the PDAC and Talisman Energy, were concerned
that any reference to a role for home states and the possibility of
“extraterritorial” jurisdiction would create confusion.282 Notably,
the submission on behalf of Talisman Energy stated:

online: Business and Human Rights Resource Centre <http://www.business
-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie-extraterritoriality-14-sep-2010.pdf>.
281

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December
1966, 993 UNTS 3 (in force 3 January 1976) [ICESCR]. See Submissions to
Consultation on Draft Guiding Principles, Document 3, supra note 212, in particular, the submissions by Emily Howie, The Human Rights Law Resource Centre
(11 January 2011); Robert Grabosch (28 January 2011); John Knox (17 January
2011); Bernd Nilles, CIDSE (31 January 2011); Thomas Lazzeri (27 January 2011);
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International and the International Center for Economic & Social Rights (January 2011); OXFAM (31 January 2011); Chip Pitts (31 January 2011); Responsible
Mineral Sector Initiative, Segal Graduate School of Business, Simon Fraser
University (31 January 2011); SOMO (31 January 2011); Castan Centre for Human
Rights Law, Monash University (January 2011, prepared by Sarah Joseph and
Adam McBeth); Robert McCorquodale (January 2011); Sherpa (January 2011);
Amnesty International, CIDSE, ESCR-Net, Human Rights Watch, International
Commission of Jurists, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH),
Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID) (14 January 2011); European
Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (27 January 2011); and Peter
Muchlinski (24 January 2011) (raising concern over the limitations of the term
“domicile”). Submissions by various governments and state human rights commissions also supported an expanded understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Canadian government did not make a public submission.
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We believe that the Special Representative can make a significant contribution in the area of extraterritorial jurisdiction by making specific recommendations for the creation of a forum and a process to enable States to
engage in multilateral deliberation with a view to developing a set of principles in relation to the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction to protect
human rights.283

The suggestion that the scope of home state jurisdiction should be
determined through a state-based process is in keeping with a positivist, state-centric analysis of international law. At first glance, this
approach may appear commendable, raising the prospect that states
will come together to agree formally to exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction in order to regulate and adjudicate transnational corporate harms. However, further thought raises the question of why
Talisman’s lawyers would have considered it appropriate to make
such a submission in the first place. If corporate counsel believed
that some things are best left to states, it was arguably inconsistent
for them to make submissions on these issues in the first place. At
the same time, submissions on other aspects of the Guiding Principles
(those not best left to states) might be entirely appropriate.
The Guiding Principles contain two other principles that are
relevant to the issue of home state jurisdiction: Principle 7 on
conflict-affected areas284 and Principle 25 on access to remedies.285
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Principle 7 must be read in light of the SRSG’s separate report on
Business and Human Rights in Conflict-Affected Regions (Conflict-Affected
Regions), a report that, notably, was “road-tested” in an exclusively
state-based process.286 While this report would have provided an
excellent opportunity to highlight the necessity of home state action
where businesses are operating in conflict-affected areas that are
clearly beyond host state regulatory control, Conflict-Affected Regions
is far more tentative. For example, “‘home’ States … have a role to
play in assisting both … corporations and host States to ensure that
businesses are not involved with human rights abuses,” such as using
“policies, laws and regulations” to warn business enterprises of the
“heightened risk of being involved with gross abuses of human
rights in conflict-affected areas” and “clearly communicat[ing] their
expectations with regard to business respect for human rights, even
in such challenging environments.”287 Unco-operative enterprises
might be subject to an ombudsperson or national contact point
mechanism as well as the “withdrawal of consular and/or business
development support,” among other measures.288 In extreme situations where gross human rights abuses have been committed, “States
should explore civil, administrative or criminal liability,” among
other measures.289 Ultimately, however, in a striking echo of the
Talisman submission and the Canadian experience with Bill C-300,
Conflict-Affected Regions concludes with a recommendation that
“multilateral standard-setting on this issue may be a necessary part
of ensuring that states move forward in the fulfillment of the state
duty to protect human rights” because “States are more inclined
to adopt policies that set standards that do not put their own businesses
at an unfair disadvantage.”290 Thus, as with Protect, Respect, and Remedy,
the SRSG’s conclusions on the role of home states, even in conflictaffected areas where egregious human rights violations are most
likely to occur, are tempered by a dose of realism. Ultimately, home
states will not regulate for fear of competitive disadvantage, even
business entities within their legal jurisdiction for acts that occur outside their
territorial jurisdiction, with the ambiguity stemming from the phrase “territory
and/or jurisdiction” as it is not clear if “jurisdiction” in this context is intended
to include “extraterritorial jurisdiction”).
286
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where host states clearly lack the capacity to protect rights and
harms unquestionably amount to serious violations of universal
human rights norms. It is left unclear, however, how in practice this
multilateral standard-setting exercise is likely to reach consensus,
given that states seem unlikely to agree to anything that might be
perceived as harming the competitive advantage of home state
businesses. Even if a text could be agreed, implementation would
remain a challenge.
Interestingly, a slightly different analysis emerges if Principle 1 is
read together with foundational Principle 25 on “access to remedy.”
Under Principle 25, states’ duty to protect clearly includes an obligation to provide access to effective remedies where abuses occur
“within their territory and/or jurisdiction.” This formulation mirrors the language of Principle 1. Yet, a notable example of a statebased non-judicial mechanism included in the commentary to
Principle 25 is that of the NCPs for the OECD Guidelines — a home
state mechanism.291 The OECD Guidelines are explicitly referred
to under Principle 2 as an example of a multilateral soft law instrument that requires implementation of domestic measures with
extraterritorial implications. This raises the question of how to
understand the term “jurisdiction” in Principle 25 and, consequently, in foundational Principle 1. As both Principles 1 and 25 use
mandatory language (“must”), there is clearly room to argue that,
at least in some circumstances, home states already have obligations
to exercise jurisdiction to protect against and remedy human rights
abuses. There is some support for this analysis if Principle 2 is read
in the context of many of the operational principles under “the
State duty to protect human rights,” which either implicitly or explicitly recommend either direct extraterritorial regulation or domestic measures with exterritorial implications.292 As these are all
written in permissive language, they are equally consistent with
291
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Principle 2 and with an encouraging, rather than sanctioning,
understanding of Principle 1.293
While this interpretation may have merit, the adoption of multistakeholder processes to inform substantive outcomes such as the
Advisory Group’s report and the Guiding Principles, and the space
created for industry lawyer submissions in legislative deliberations
such as those relating to Bill C-300, ultimately make it unlikely that
traditional binding “command-and-control” regulation, or even
the conditionality of support with legally binding sanctions, will be
implemented in home state practice any time soon, at least in Canada. This unlikelihood can be attributed in part to beliefs about the
impact of the relevant instruments on the competitive advantage
of businesses. However, there are implications for legal theory, too,
that are generally neither discussed nor reflected in the submissions
of either civil society or industry contributors. Constructivist international relations scholarship, including Ruggie’s work, has influenced international legal scholars such that they may be more likely
to acknowledge that non-state actors are participants in the creation
of international legal norms.294 Yet many submissions by non-state
actor participants in the processes described earlier seem to reflect
a state-centric understanding of international law that is arguably
inconsistent with their own participation. Thus, they may be more
likely to promote narrow views of the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states295 as
well as views that strongly endorse the value of legal, over non-judicial, remedial mechanisms.296
Another related and extremely important aspect of multistakeholder discourse is recognition. For a multi-stakeholder process
to work, participants must recognize each other as being legitimately
at the table. Yet this requirement begs the question of what happens

293

See Seck, supra note 195.

294

See, eg, Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, “International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law” (2000) 39
Colum J Transnat’l L 19; Julie Mertus, “Considering Nonstate Actors in the New
Millenium: Toward Expanded Participation in Norm Generation and Norm
Application” (2000) 32 NYUJ Int’l L & Pol 537.

295

PDAC Submission and Talisman Energy, supra note 282.

296

MiningWatch Canada, Comments on the Draft Guiding Principles (31January,
2011), online: Business and Human Rights Resource Centre <http://www.
business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Protect-Respect-Remedy
-Framework/GuidingPrinciples/Submissions>.

Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights

113

when some potential participants are not recognized by others
(for example, affected, perhaps indigenous, communities; “antidevelopment” NGOs; or even “anti-community-consent” businesses)
and are consequently deemed unworthy of participation. Similarly,
what happens when relationships break down? A curious feature of
Bill C-300 is that it was not all that different from a proposal contained in the industry-civil society Advisory Group’s report. Yet industry and civil society relationships clearly deteriorated in the
interim, producing a remarkable industry backlash that was wildly
out of proportion to the mild proposals in the bill.
The Canadian initiatives aimed at addressing allegations of wrongdoing by Canadian mining companies operating internationally,
reviewed earlier, are in marked contrast with the situation in 1999
when I reviewed in this Yearbook the public and private international
law dimensions of environmental harm caused by Canadian mining
companies overseas.297 This increased Canadian activity could serve
as evidence of state practice supporting the emergence of customary
international legal rules confirming either the permissive or mandatory nature of home state jurisdiction to regulate and adjudicate
transnational corporate conduct to prevent and remedy environmental and human rights harms. As Canada is known as “a particularly strong player in the global mining sector,” the exercise of
jurisdiction by Canada over transnational mining companies in
order to prevent and remedy environmental and human rights
harms would serve as a significant step in the development of customary international law.298 As a consequence, the outcomes of
processes such as the roundtables and Bill C-300 have implications
not only for Canada but also for the international community more
generally.299 Yet the role of business and corporate counsel in influencing this state practice is easily overlooked in traditional international legal analysis.
Conclusions
This article has provided an overview of developments in Canada
between 2005 and 2011 relating to the regulation and adjudication
of human rights concerns associated with global mining, with the
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aim of documenting the challenges faced by legal reform proposals
designed to prevent or remedy global mining harms. The article
has also described the work undertaken by the SRSG in relation to
the home state duty to protect human rights, highlighting the conclusions reached in the Guiding Principles in relation to the existence
and scope of home state obligations. In both contexts, industry,
industry lawyers, and other non-state actors participated in processes
designed to address these issues. And, in each context, the outcome
of such participation is that traditional legal frameworks, whether
domestic command and control, conditionality laws, or international human rights laws articulating firm home state obligations, will
have a limited role to play. This result gives cause to reflect on the
implications of non-state corporate actor participation in the development of international norms relating to the existence and
scope of home state human rights obligations.
The implications are important not only for the specific question
of the regulation of human rights concerns arising from global
mining but also for related ones. For example, James Anaya, the
UN special rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, recently
endorsed the SRSG’s pragmatic approach in relation to an issue of
great importance to both the global mining industry and indigenous
peoples. Anaya’s July 2011 report to the UN Human Rights Council
proposes the need to develop a set of specific guidelines or principles “operationaliz[ing] the rights of indigenous peoples in the
context of natural resource extraction and development projects
affecting indigenous territories.”300 To do so, Anaya calls for “expert
consultations and studies” so as to promote an “effective and practicable” understanding of indigenous rights.301 According to Anaya,
of “utmost importance” is the “bridging of divergent viewpoints of
States, indigenous peoples and corporate actors” though a “process
of wide consultations and dialogues with all actors.”302
This article shows both the possibilities and the potential limitations for law reform of such an approach. The processes reviewed
in this article suggest that engaging with industry and industry
lawyers will lead to outcomes that may in theory reduce the number
of corporate human rights abuses in the mining sector due to the
300
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proliferation of voluntary codes, host state local community capacity building, and the CSR education of junior mining companies.
Yet even if this optimistic picture proves well founded, improved
access to legal remedies for those that ultimately are harmed will
not be forthcoming.
Importantly, it does not necessarily follow from these conclusions
that businesses and their lawyers should not be allowed to participate
in these processes. Indeed, it is inevitable that they will, whether
directly in the process that creates the legal framework or after the
fact by contesting an outcome that they did not participate in shaping. My conclusion, then, is the more modest claim that if the reality
of industry and corporate legal power is recognized and accommodated, it should come as no surprise that legislated remedies or
internationally binding rules prove unattainable. We must either
come to terms with a new understanding of the limitations of both
domestic and international law or seek new ways of harnessing corporate power, perhaps by exploring the ethical obligations of corporate lawyers as participants in international legal processes.303
Sommaire
Entre 2005 et 2011, les débats se multiplient, tant au Canada qu’au
sein de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU), sur le rôle des
États d’origine dans la réglementation et la poursuite des violations
des droits de la personne liées aux activités transnationales de sociétés. Au Canada, ce débat est axé sur des préoccupations liées à
l’exploitation minière mondiale, et conduit à une série de rapports
et de propositions de la part du gouvernement, des parties de l’opposition et d’autres intervenants. En résulte, en 2010, la nomination
d’une conseillère du secteur des entreprises extractives sur la responsabilité sociale et la défaite du projet de loi C-300 (la Loi sur la
responsabilisation des sociétés à l’égard de leurs activités minières,
pétrolières ou gazières dans les pays en développement). Entretemps, le professeur John G. Ruggie est nommé Représentant spécial
du Secrétaire général chargé de la question des droits de l’homme
et des sociétés transnationales par la Commission (depuis: le
Conseil) des droits de l’homme de l’ONU. Le travail de Ruggie
303
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conduit à l’élaboration, en 2008, du cadre de référence “Protéger,
respecter et réparer” et, en 2011, des “Principes directeurs relatifs aux
entreprises et aux droits de l’homme.” Bien que ces deux documents
reconnaissent le devoir qui incombe aux États de protéger contre
les violations des droits de l’homme par les entreprises et la nécessité
d’accès à des recours par les victimes, le rôle des États d’origine à
cet égard y est contesté. Cet article compare les développements
au Canada entre 2005 et 2011 avec ceux de l’ONU en ce qui concerne
les devoirs d’États d’origine pour la protection des droits de la
personne dans le contexte d’exploitation transnationale par les
sociétés. Il offre également des réflexions sur les enjeux de l’inévitabilité de la participation d’entreprises et de leurs avocats pour le
développement d’obligations juridiques pour les états d’origine.
Summary
Between 2005 and 2011, there was much debate, both within Canada
and at the United Nations (UN), over what role home states should
play in the regulation and adjudication of human rights harms associated with transnational corporate conduct. In Canada, this
debate focused upon concerns related to global mining that led to
a series of government, opposition and multi-stakeholder reports
and proposals. These culminated in 2010 with the appointment of
an Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor
and the defeat of Bill C-300, An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in Developing Countries. Meanwhile, at the UN Human Rights Commission/Council,
John G. Ruggie was appointed Special Representative to the UN
Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights (SRSG). Ruggie’s
work led to the 2008 Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for
Business and Human Rights and the 2011 Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (the latter designed to “operationalize” the
former). While both documents highlight state duties to protect
against human rights violations by businesses and the need for access to remedies by victims, the role of home states in this regard
was contested. This article compares the developments in Canada
between 2005 and 2011 with the work of the SRSG in relation to the
home state duty to protect human rights in the transnational corporate context. It also offers reflections on the implications of the
inevitability of industry and industry lawyer participation for the
development of home state legal obligations.

